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FOREWORD
The accounting profession, the financial community, government reg­
ulatory bodies, and the general public all have a vital interest in the 
quality of performance of independent public accountants. This report 
is a part of the efforts of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) to inform those publics of the accounting profes­
sion’s programs to safeguard the public interest in the work of CPAs 
and to assure a continuing commitment to quality performance by CPAs. 
The report is the product of the SECPS Review Committee, a special 
committee formed in 1983 to review the structure, operations, and 
effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA Division 
for CPA Firms. It is more than an evaluation of that program: It is a 
positive and understandable description of what the program is and how 
it fits into the overall scheme of public and private regulation, as well as 
a positive reinforcement of a highly successful program to improve the 
quality of audit practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and to safeguard the public interest in the financial reporting process. 
It complements a similar review and evaluation of the Private Companies 
Practice Section (PCPS) of the Division for CPA Firms completed earlier 
by another Institute special committee, the PCPS Structure Committee.
A profession must be constantly vigilant to improve its performance 
and to retain public trust. In the October 1978 edition of Harpers, the 
noted scholar and writer Jacques Barzun observed that: “a profession is 
by nature a vulnerable institution. It makes claims; it demands unique 
privileges; and it has to perform.” This report chronicles and evaluates 
one aspect of that performance by the accounting profession, the SEC 
Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms. The overall evaluation 
is that the structure of the section is sound and its major programs are 
effective. But the report recommends some significant changes to improve 
both the operations and the public understanding of the section.
The SECPS executive committee has accepted the report’s recommen­
dations and, as indicated in the letter from the chairman of that committee 
in Appendix C, has begun to implement them. The board of directors 
believes this will strengthen an already strong and viable program. But, 
perhaps even more important, the improved awareness and understand­
ing of the program that should result from these efforts will enhance
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both public acceptance of the work of CPAs and public confidence in 
that work.
We commend the members of the SECPS review committee for their 
dedication and industry in this worthwhile effort. All of the members of 
the committee, including two from outside of the accounting profession, 
have had a long history of service to the profession. Under the able 
leadership of Michael N. Chetkovich, the chairman of the Institute in 
1977 when the Division of CPA Firms was established, the committee 
has made a valuable contribution to the Institute, to the profession, and 
to the public. We appreciate their effort and the timely and efficient 
manner in which it was performed.
Bernard Z. Lee 
Chairman of the Board
Philip B. Chenok 
President
New York 
October 1984
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INTRODUCTION
In February 1983, Rholan E. Larson, then the chairman of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, or the Institute), 
appointed a special committee to review the structure, operations, and 
effectiveness of the SEC practice section (SECPS, or the section) of the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms. The committee was given the charge to 
review and evaluate the activities of the SECPS since its formation in 
light of the section’s goal to improve the quality of practice before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission—including the activities of its 
executive, peer review, and special investigations committees, the role of 
the Public Oversight Board in the process, and the section’s objectives, 
membership requirements, organizational structure, and functions—and 
to report its findings to the AICPA Board of Directors.
The members of the committee, including two individuals from outside 
the accounting profession, are:
Michael N. Chetkovich, Chairman
George R. Catlett
J. Michael Cook
Gerald W. Hepp
Richard S. Hickok
William S. Kanaga 
Thomas C. Pryor 
Abraham M. Stanger 
Marvin L. Stone
All of the CPAs on the committee have been actively involved in the 
Institute, serving or having served on its governing bodies, on senior 
committees, or in other capacities. Three members are past chairmen of 
the Institute: Michael N. Chetkovich (1976—77), former managing part­
ner of Deloitte Haskins & Sells; William S. Kanaga (1980—81), managing 
partner of Arthur Young 8c Company; and Marvin L. Stone (1967—68), 
a consultant, who until recently was a senior partner of Coopers & 
Lybrand. The professional affiliation of other CPAs on the committee 
are George R. Catlett, retired senior partner, Arthur Andersen &: Co.; 
J. Michael Cook, managing partner-designate, Deloitte Haskins 8c Sells; 
Gerald W. Hepp, senior partner, Plante 8c Moran; and Richard S. Hickok, 
chairman emeritus of Main Hurdman/KMG. The two members from 
outside the profession are Thomas C. Pryor, senior vice president, 
Jennison Associates, investment managers, and a member of the Insti­
tute’s Board of Directors since 1978; and Abraham M. Stanger, member
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of the New York City law firm of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson 
and adjunct professor of law, New York University.
The Division for CPA Firms, established in 1977, represented a bold 
and unique approach to professional self-regulation and one for which 
there still is no counterpart outside the public accounting profession. 
After over six years of experience with the division, an evaluation is 
desirable to determine whether the SECPS has been responsive to its 
purpose, whether it remains sufficiently relevant in today’s environment, 
and what changes should be made to enhance its effectiveness. This 
report is the result of that review. It was completed and submitted to 
the AICPA Board of Directors in June of 1984.
The remainder of this report consists of six chapters and three 
appendixes. Chapter 2 is an overview that summarizes the principal 
findings and describes the review process. Chapter 3 is a discussion of 
self-regulation to provide the context and a framework for an under­
standing of the review and evaluation process and the conclusions. 
Chapter 4 presents background information on the SECPS. Chapter 5 
presents the results of the review and evaluation; it contains the com­
mittee’s conclusions, suggestions, and specific recommendations (high­
lighted in boldfaced type) and the underlying rationale. Chapter 6 is a 
summation. Appendix A contains a description of the components and 
programs of the section and a discussion of their activities to date. 
Appendix B is a reprint of the article, “Self-Regulation—Perils and 
Problems,” by Robert K. Mautz, from the May 1983 Journal of Accountancy. 
Appendix C is the response to the conclusions and recommendations of 
the report from the chairman of the SECPS Executive Committee.
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OVERVIEW
The SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms is significant in 
the overall structure of self-regulation in the accounting profession, but 
it is only a part of that structure. In this report, we review and evaluate 
the section in terms of its effectiveness in the broad context of self­
regulation and present our recommendations for changes and initiatives 
designed to enhance its effectiveness.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The SECPS, which has as its primary objective the maintenance of high 
standards of performance in the accounting and audit practice of CPA 
firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is only one 
of several closely interrelated segments of the profession’s overall struc­
ture for self-regulation. The objectives of self-regulation are achieved 
primarily through the voluntary compliance of members of the profession 
with established standards and rules and through their cooperation in 
taking remedial or corrective actions when deficiencies are noted. A 
proper understanding of the basic nature of self-regulation, of its scope 
and objectives, of how it differs from public regulation, as well as of the 
interrelationships among its various elements is critical to an evaluation 
of the section’s performance.
Our overall evaluation is that the structure of the section is sound and 
that it is carrying out its major programs in an effective manner. The 
dedication shown by members of the profession who have taken an 
active part in the administration and operations of the section—partic­
ularly those who have served on its executive, peer review, and special 
investigations committees—and their contributions of time and effort 
are commendable.
Although our overall evaluation is favorable, we see the need for some 
significant changes and improvements. Accordingly, we recommend in 
this report a number of ways in which the program might be improved.
While the level and composition of membership in the section is 
reasonable for a voluntary organization, efforts to attract as members all 
firms with SEC clients should continue. We see a real need to develop 
an effective public information program, one that will make the section’s 
objectives and accomplishments better known to, and better understood
by, various interested audiences. Accordingly, we recommend that the 
section develop a broad-based public information program, including, 
but not limited to, the issuance of periodic reports on the scope and 
results of its activities.
The Public Oversight Board (POB, or board), both in concept and in 
performance, has strengthened the structure and effectiveness of the 
section. It has performed commendably in reporting on and explaining 
the system to the public and in suggesting improvements. The stature 
and credibility of the board have contributed significantly to the viability 
of the section and are critical to public acceptance of the profession’s 
program of self-regulation.
The executive committee has met its responsibility to direct the program 
and has made changes as necessary to meet the needs of the public and 
the profession. The present size and composition of the committee and 
the procedures for selecting its members appear to be satisfactory; 
however, we recommend that firms represented on the committee make 
a greater effort to select as representatives individuals who can speak 
authoritatively for their firms and who will attend meetings regularly. 
We also recommend initiatives that the committee might take to—
•  Improve communications among the components of the section 
and with other groups.
•  Clarify the conditions under which it would impose sanctions.
•  Develop new programs to enhance the benefits of membership.
The peer review program, the major undertaking of the section, is 
basically sound and is functioning effectively. It has been beneficial to 
member firms and to the public in helping to assure and enhance the 
quality of the accounting and audit practice of member firms. We concur 
with the section’s recent decision that litigation involving a firm should 
be considered in determining the scope of a peer review. We believe 
that the requirement for member firms to undergo peer reviews every 
three years continues to be appropriate, and we do not see the need at 
this time for any other fundamental changes in the peer review process. 
In terms of actions that should be taken, we recommend that the section 
adopt more specific requirements relating to the evaluation in peer 
reviews of the effectiveness of a firm’s second-partner review program.
The investigative process complements the peer review program and 
has operated effectively within the established guidelines for its activities. 
While the special investigations committee has performed a difficult 
assignment in a creditable manner, actions can be taken to enhance its 
effectiveness and acceptance. We recommend that steps be taken to—
•  Clarify the scope of its authority and its mode of operation.
•  Disseminate more information about its activities.
•  Expand the scope of the cases that member firms are required 
to report.
•  Achieve more equitable and consistent treatment of the cost of 
special peer reviews.
A standing coordinating committee should be established to facilitate 
and encourage greater coordination between the two sections of the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
THE REVIEW PROCESS
The review encompassed the circumstances that led to the formation of 
the section and its objectives, organizational structure, programs, oper­
ations, and achievements. We considered the views of selected leaders 
of the profession, including the current and past chairmen of the major 
committees of the section, the membership of the section, the POB, 
representatives of the SEC and of the U.S. General Accounting Office, 
and others.
We met with various individuals and groups to discuss the areas of 
interest and concern. Representatives of the major committees of the 
section discussed with us their views on the operations of the section, 
responded to our questions, and provided us with background infor­
mation on the activities of the section. Members of the SEC staff, 
including the Chief Accountant, gave us the benefit of their views on 
the effectiveness of the program and on issues confronting the section. 
The POB discussed with us their procedures, conclusions, and recom­
mendations. The chairman of our committee and senior AICPA staff 
met with the chairman of the SEC and the Comptroller General of the 
United States to obtain their views and suggestions. Individual committee 
members had similar meetings with other persons interested in the work 
of the section. A representative number of SECPS member firms 
submitted their views and comments to us in writing in response to our 
communication to each member firm describing our charge and asking 
for the firm’s views and comments on matters of concern to it. The 
comments received were candid and constructive. They provided useful 
insights for our deliberations.
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SELF-REGUUTION IN THE 
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
The SECPS is one of the significant elements of the profession’s overall 
program of self-regulation. Therefore, an understanding of self-regu­
lation and of what it is expected to accomplish is essential to an evaluation 
of the SECPS.
DEFINITION AND FOCUS
Self-regulation, as the term is used in this report, comprehends all of 
the standards of skill and competence for entering and continuing in 
the accounting profession. It comprehends standards relating to require­
ments for continuing professional education as well as technical, ethical, 
and quality control standards and the related compliance and disciplinary 
procedures that apply to CPAs and CPA firms as a result of their 
voluntary memberships in professional organizations, primarily the 
AICPA and its components. In this report, the primary focus is on the 
SECPS’s program to maintain and enhance the quality of accounting 
and audit practice in CPA firms by monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with established quality control standards and the membership require­
ments of the section.
CPA firms individually also have a significant role in self-regulation. 
They perform that role through their intra-firm procedures for compli­
ance with professional standards in their practices and through their 
actions with regard to individuals who fail to comply with professional 
and firm standards and with other standards required of professionals. 
The internal quality control procedures of CPA firms, such as their 
inspection programs, contribute to the effectiveness of compliance pro­
grams conducted through professional organizations, particularly as they 
relate to individuals, and constitute an important element of professional 
self-regulation.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
In discussing self-regulation and its relationship to public regulation, 
Professor Robert K. Mautz, a member of the POB, pointed out that
Unrealistic expectations arise because critics of the self-regulatory process— 
and even some of the participants—fail to recognize that—
•  Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in scope, operating within the 
constraints imposed by an already existing and rigorous disciplinary 
system.
•  Any regulatory activity, and self-regulation in particular, requires a 
difficult balancing o f private right and public good.
•  Self-regulation differs from public regulation in motivation, method 
and purpose.1
In commenting on the scope and objectives of self-regulation, Rholan 
E. Larson, writing as AICPA chairman, noted that
Some critics, both within and outside the profession, maintain that the 
accounting profession hasn’t achieved the objective of self-regulation because 
it hasn’t publicly sanctioned firms when audit failures have been alleged.2
He went on to discuss the objectives of self-regulation and stressed that
The real objective of the profession’s self-regulatory program is improve­
ment in the quality of practice. The program must create an environment 
whereby firms understand what is necessary for quality practice, implement 
appropriate policies and procedures, subject their compliance with their 
policies and procedures to independent peer review and, most important, 
take corrective action when needed.3
Self-regulation encompasses all of the standards and enforcement 
procedures established and maintained by a profession to promote a 
high quality of performance. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsi­
bilities noted that the overall effectiveness of self-regulation depends on 
the satisfactory performance of all of its elements operating and inter­
acting as a system.4 The commission identified the four elements of such 
a system:
1. Establishing high standards of skill and competence both for entering 
the profession and for continuing the right to practice.
2. Developing and promulgating technical and ethical standards that serve 
both as performance goals and as means of measuring departures.
1. Robert K. Mautz, “Self-Regulation—Perils and Problems,”J ournal of Accountancy 
(May 1983), pp. 76-84. (The article is included in this report as Appendix B.)
2. Rholan E. Larson, “Self-Regulation: A Professional Step Forward,” Journal of 
Accountancy (September 1983), pp. 58-64.
3. Ibid., p. 60.
4. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
(New York: Commission of Auditor’s Responsibilities, 1978).
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3. Designing and implementing quality control policies and procedures to 
monitor and encourage compliance with the technical and ethical 
standards.
4 . An effective disciplinary system to impose penalties for performance 
or conduct that departs from standards established by law, SEC regu­
lation, or the profession.5
The Mautz article previously cited points out that self-regulation and 
public regulation of public accountants share a broad objective: to benefit 
the financial community while not unnecessarily restricting personal 
freedom. An effective system of self-regulation creates an environment 
that results in participants seeking and achieving constant improvement 
in the quality of practice within their profession.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but one element in a complex system 
of controls. Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession a limited set of 
privileges, among them the right and responsibility to develop, establish, 
review and refine standards of professional performance. Society does so 
at least partly because it believes the technical expertise and situational 
understanding of members o f the profession qualify them to perform that 
role effectively. There is no reason, nor has accounting the ability, to 
challenge the other participants in the total regulatory structure. If ac­
countants perform their role satisfactorily, the tasks of others will all be 
eased. Accountants have a small niche in the total regulatory process but 
an important one.6
The article (Appendix B of this report) discusses the important differ­
ences between self-regulation and public regulation and notes the 
significant challenges confronting self-regulation.
Self-regulation cannot be meaningfully evaluated in isolation from 
public regulation. The state boards that administer accountancy statutes, 
the SEC with its statutory responsibility to protect the public interest, 
the courts with their role in adjudicating disputes and meting out 
punishment—all of these play important roles in regulating the profes­
sion.
On the relationships among the various elements of regulation, the 
report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities stated that
Quality control is only one means of monitoring professional practice. State 
boards o f accountancy, the profession, the courts, and the SEC impose 
sanctions on individuals or firms for performance or conduct that violates 
professional standards or civil or criminal laws.7
5. Ibid., p. 141.
6. Mautz, “Self-Regulation—Perils and Problems,” p. 77. Also, in “Self-Regulation— 
Criticism and Response,”  Journal of Accountancy (April 1984), Professor Mautz 
responds to some of the criticisms that have been made of self-regulation, with 
particular emphasis on criticisms of the SECPS.
7. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities Report, p. 147.
In discussing penalties and the effects of litigation and enforcement 
proceedings, the report noted that
Penalties imposed by courts and the SEC overshadow professional self- 
discipline as means of ensuring adequate performance and professional 
conduct, and they are probably the most effective purely disciplinary means 
of protecting the public against substandard auditor performance.8
The success of self-regulation in the accounting profession depends, 
to a considerable extent, on mutual trust and cooperation among peers— 
fellow practitioners who share the same professional responsibilities. The 
peer review program of the SECPS, the centerpiece of the system of 
self-regulation for CPA firms, is an excellent illustration of the involve­
ment of peers in self-regulation.
ROLE OF SANCTIONS
An understanding of the role of sanctions—that is, of how penalties and 
punishment are used in a system of self-regulation—is essential to an 
evaluation of the role and effectiveness of the SECPS. The term 
“sanctions,” as used by the drafters of the organizational document of 
the SECPS, encompasses actions to censure, suspend, or expel a member. 
In practice, the inherent characteristics of self-regulation, so clearly set 
forth by Robert Mautz (see Appendix B) have led the section in a 
direction more corrective than punitive in nature.
Actions taken against firms during the initial six-year period of 
operation of the SECPS, which have had the effect but not the form of 
sanctions, have required member firms to remedy or correct past 
deficiencies in order to avoid the recurrence of such problems in the 
future. Such actions have been costly to those firms in terms of expend­
iture of time and money. Thus, the section has used the threat of 
sanctions to assure the cooperation of its members in abiding by its 
membership requirements, in taking remedial or corrective actions when 
required, and, ultimately, in accomplishing its objective of improving the 
quality of practice.
Under the SECPS’s organizational document, the authority to formally 
impose sanctions—primarily to censure, suspend, or expel—is reserved 
to its executive committee. That committee has carefully defined the 
process for the formal imposition of sanctions. However, the section’s 
peer review and special investigations committees have the authority to 
require firms to take remedial or corrective actions when deficiencies in 
a member firm’s quality-control system are found in the peer review and 
investigative processes. Those committees also can recommend that the 
executive committee impose sanctions if a member firm refuses to 
cooperate in taking the required actions. Follow-up procedures, such as 
an early revisit by peer reviewers, an accelerated peer review (a repeat 
peer review in one or two years rather than the normal three years), or
8. Ibid., p. 151.
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a special extended review in a particular area are measures that have 
been employed to assure that member firms take the actions recom­
mended by the committees.
Within the context of the section’s original purpose and objectives, 
costs of such actions have the effect, though not the form, of a sanction. 
Further, the remedial or corrective actions taken by member firms found 
to have deficiencies have involved dealing with firms’ partners and 
professional staff whose performance contributed to the deficiencies— 
including actions such as reassignments, significant additional training 
and education, restrictions as to the type of work they perform, and 
dismissals.
The authority residing in the executive committee to formally impose 
sanctions is effective in assuring that member firms cooperate with the 
committees of the section, take remedial or corrective actions when 
necessary, and abide by the section’s membership requirements. The 
executive committee may also use its formal procedures to sanction a 
member firm for an egregious act for which corrective action is an 
inadequate response.
The executive committee has not yet used such procedures to censure, 
suspend, or expel a member firm. To date, member firms have taken 
appropriate remedial or corrective actions in response to findings in the 
peer review program and the investigative process.
During the period under review, there have been a number of well- 
publicized cases of alleged audit failure. Those cases have been the 
subject of court and regulatory actions, with the concomitants of legal 
authority and the checks and balances of “due process” clearly set forth 
in the American system of justice. Courts and regulatory agencies, with 
their power to subpoena documents and to require testimony under 
oath, are in the best position to ascertain the facts while observing due 
process to protect the rights of parties and to determine blame and assess 
penalties.
The SECPS cannot and should not take actions in an individual case 
that supplant the established legal procedures developed to serve the 
public and protect the rights of persons accused or suspected of wrong­
doing. Among the inherent risks of substituting the judgment of the 
SECPS for that of duly constituted authorities is the substantial prejudice 
to persons that may result from conclusions on a matter under active 
consideration by such authorities.
The SECPS, through its special investigations committee, can and does 
make various types of investigations of firms involved in alleged audit 
failures, as discussed later in this report. However, the emphasis of the 
SECPS in such investigations, as well as in its peer review program and 
its membership requirements, is to encourage and aid member firms in 
a timely manner to improve quality control systems with the objective of 
doing everything feasible to reduce the possibility of audit failure. The 
authority to impose sanctions helps to assure the cooperation of member 
firms in that effort. In our view, that is the most effective way for a 
voluntary organization in the private sector to fulfill its self-regulatory 
role.
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BACKGROUND
The AICPA Division for CPA Firms, formed in 1977, consists of two 
autonomous and largely independent sections, the SECPS (SEC Practice 
Section) and the PCPS (Private Companies Practice Section). The primary 
objective of the SECPS is to improve the quality of practice by CPA firms 
before the SEC; the activities of the PCPS are directed primarily toward 
improving the quality of the auditing and accounting services provided 
by CPA firms to private organizations. Any CPA firm may join either or 
both sections without regard to whether the firm practices before the 
SEC. A review of the structure and functions of the SECPS and the role 
of SEC provides background for our findings. Appendix A contains a 
detailed discussion of the subject and a review of the section’s activities 
since its formation.
PRESENT SECPS STRUCTURE AND 
FUNCTIONS
The Division for CPA Firms and the SECPS were created to provide a 
structure within the AICPA for regulation of CPA firms, in contrast to 
individual CPAs, as a result of challenges facing the profession in the 
1970s. Membership in the AICPA, the mechanism for the programs of 
self-regulation then in existence, was—and still is—on an individual basis, 
and so there was no role in the AICPA for CPA firms as such. The 
formation of the division by action of council established a voluntary 
membership organization within the structure of the Institute for CPA 
firms, with designated membership requirements and authority to initiate 
a program of self-regulation for CPA firms.
Thus, the SECPS provides the organizational structure and processes 
for the self-regulation of firms with SEC audit practices. It monitors and 
enforces compliance with quality control standards through periodic 
peer reviews, establishes and enforces membership requirements, re­
sponds to the implications of alleged audit failures while litigation is still 
in process, and provides through the POB a mechanism for oversight, 
which explicitly recognizes and reflects the public interest in reliable 
financial reporting. The system is based primarily on voluntary compli­
ance, cooperation, and remedial action.
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The functions of the section are conducted through three major 
committees: the executive committee, the peer review committee, and 
the special investigations committee. Under the supervision of the AICPA 
vice president-technical, the AICPA provides staff support for all of the 
activities of the section. The five-member POB, formed in 1978, provides 
public oversight of the activities of the section. Those entities are described 
briefly in the paragraphs that follow.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
The POB was established to represent the public interest by providing 
continuing independent overview of the section’s activities. It consists of 
five individuals of recognized integrity and high reputation and is 
structured so as to assure independence. It has the authority to appoint, 
remove, and set the terms of compensation of its members and to select 
its chairman; the only limitation on its authority is that appointment of 
its members must have the concurrence of the AICPA Board of Directors. 
The SECPS has no authority over the POB.
John J. McCloy, who served with distinction as chairman of the board 
since its inception, resigned from the board in 1984 for personal reasons. 
The current chairman, Arthur M. Wood, and one member, John D. 
Harper, have served on the board since its inception. More recent 
appointments are Robert K. Mautz, named in 1981, and A. A. Sommer, 
Jr., a former SEC commissioner, appointed in 1983. Richard A. Stark 
serves as the board’s legal counsel. The board has a permanent staff of 
six (four professional and two administrative) headed by Louis W. 
Matusiak, the executive director and secretary. Retired partners of CPA 
firms have also served as part-time supplemental staff.
The board monitors all of the activities of the SECPS, with special 
emphasis on the effectiveness of the peer review program and the special 
investigations process. It also recommends to the executive committee, 
whenever it sees fit, improvements in the section’s membership require­
ments, standards, policies, and procedures. It publishes an annual report 
on its evaluation of the activities of the section and has the authority to 
issue other reports as it deems appropriate.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The section is governed by an executive committee, composed of 
representatives from twenty-one member firms, that has the status of a 
senior committee of the AICPA. The executive committee establishes 
general policies for the section and has the authority to amend its 
membership requirements, to establish budgets and dues to finance the 
operations of the section, to deal with complaints against members, to 
impose sanctions on member firms, to appoint committees and task 
forces, to interact with other AICPA boards and committees, and to 
consult with the POB.
PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
The most demanding requirement of membership in the section is that 
each member firm undergo a peer review of its accounting and audit
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practice every three years. The peer review committee, consisting of 
fifteen members appointed by the executive committee, establishes 
standards for peer reviews, administers the peer review program, and 
reviews each report. Staff support is received from the AICPA Quality 
Control Review Division.
From the inception of the peer review program to December 31, 1983, 
510 peer reviews, including initial and subsequent reviews, had been 
completed. Those reviews resulted in 433 unqualified reports (360 of 
which were accompanied by letters of comment suggesting improvements 
to reviewed firms’ quality-control systems), 64 modified reports (reports 
with qualified opinions), and 13 adverse reports (reports expressing 
negative opinions). Additional requirements, such as revisits by peer 
reviewers or accelerated peer reviews, were deemed necessary by the 
peer review committee in 72 instances and, in each instance, were agreed 
to by the firms involved.
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
The special investigations committee responds to concerns raised by 
alleged audit failures. The committee was established by the executive 
committee in November 1979 in recognition of the significant public 
interest in matters concerning the practice of public accounting that have 
a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC registrants. 
The functions assigned to the special investigations committee are the 
following.
1. Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the public and to 
the profession that member firms are complying with profes­
sional standards in the conduct of their practice before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission by identifying corrective 
measures, if any, that should be taken by a member firm involved 
in a specific alleged audit failure.
2. Assist in improving the quality of practice by member firms 
before the Securities and Exchange Commission by determining 
whether facts relating to specific alleged audit failures indicate 
that changes in generally accepted auditing standards or quality 
control standards need to be considered.
3. Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed neces­
sary, appropriate sanctions with respect to the member firms 
involved.
Member firms are required to report promptly to the special investi­
gations committee certain litigation, proceedings, or investigations in­
volving the firm or its personnel. Generally speaking, reportable cases 
are those alleging audit deficiencies in connection with filings made by 
a firm’s SEC clients under the federal securities laws.
The committee conducts its activities in four modes described as 
screening, monitoring, investigating a firm, and investigating a case—all 
on a confidential basis. However, in keeping with its oversight and public 
reporting roles, the Public Oversight Board has complete access to the 
process.
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Through December 31, 1983, the committee had placed eighty-two 
cases on its agenda, of which sixty-five had been closed. Of the seventeen 
active cases, twelve were being screened, current developments in three 
were being monitored, and two were open pending the completion of 
an investigation of the firm.9 Of the closed cases, three involved inves­
tigations of firms.
The special investigations committee has identified the need for 
corrective action by firms involved in reported cases in all three of the 
activity modes in which it has operated to date (screening, monitoring, 
and investigating a firm) and, in each instance, the firm involved has 
responded by taking action to correct indicated deficiencies.
MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Any CPA firm that agrees to abide by the membership requirements 
may join the SECPS. The membership requirements consist of general 
requirements that apply to all firms and special requirements that apply 
only to members with SEC clients. Appendix A of this report presents 
a summary of the membership requirements and information on the 
composition and level of membership.
At December 31, 1983, the membership consisted of 439 firms, of 
which 428 were also members of the PCPS. According to the POB’s 
report for the year ending June 30, 1983, the member firms with SEC 
clients at that date audited the financial statements of 85 percent by 
number, and over 98 percent by combined sales volume, of the publicly 
traded companies (some of which are not SEC registrants) listed in Who 
Audits America. The member firms also audited all but three of the U.S. 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and all but twenty- 
four of those listed on the American Stock Exchange.10
COST OF THE PROGRAM
The cost of the program measured both in dollars and in the voluntary 
time commitment of participants is substantial. Annual expenditures to 
administer the Division for CPA Firms and the Public Oversight Board 
approximate $2.5 million. The aggregate annual costs incurred by SECPS 
member firms cannot be determined with precision, but we estimate that 
the costs, principally for peer review and exclusive of costs incurred 
internally to install, maintain, and monitor quality control systems, are 
about $6 million annually. In addition, many thousands of man-hours 
are devoted annually to the program by individuals from member firms 
who serve on the section’s committees and task forces.
9.
10.
Member firms reported seventy-five of the eighty-two cases pursuant to the 
section’s membership requirements and reported seven additional cases that 
were outside the scope of the membership requirements.
Data Financial Press, Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, California: Data 
Financial Press, 1982).
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ROLE OF THE SEC
The SEC has the responsibility to monitor the practice of accountants 
before the commission. In carrying out that responsibility, the commission 
places considerable reliance on the profession’s programs of self-regu­
lation. It actively monitors all aspects of self-regulation in the profession, 
giving particular attention to the SECPS, and reports annually to Congress 
on its assessment of the program’s effectiveness. The commission coor­
dinates its monitoring of the section’s programs with the POB’s oversight 
activities. It independently evaluates the peer review process, including 
the effectiveness of POB oversight. Through its staff, it inspects a sample 
of peer review work papers and POB oversight documentation under 
an arrangement worked out with the SECPS. The commission does not, 
however, have direct access to the special investigative process.
The commission maintains a high level of interest in the program and 
actively supports its objectives. The commission has provided constructive 
suggestions for improvements. The annual SEC reports to Congress on 
the accounting profession have expressed interest in and general support 
for the profession’s self-regulatory processes. The reports have also 
identified the commission’s concerns about those processes.
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chapter 5
THE REVIEW
In our review and evaluation, we focused on matters in the following 
areas.
•  Public awareness of the section—enhancement of the overall effec­
tiveness of the section, the viability of the concept of self­
regulation, and the public perception of the concept.
•  Public oversight—the structure, operations, and effectiveness of 
the POB.
•  Executive committee—the structure, operations, and effectiveness 
of the executive committee.
•  Peer review program—the standards, operations, and effectiveness 
of the peer review program, as administered by the peer review 
committee, including that committee’s relations with other com­
ponents of the section and of the AICPA.
•  Investigative process—the structure, authority, policies, operating 
procedures, and effectiveness of the special investigations com­
mittee and its relations with other components of the section and 
of the AICPA.
•  Membership and membership requirements—the level of membership 
in the section and the section’s membership requirements.
•  Programs to enhance benefits of membership—providing technical 
information on SEC practice through annual meetings, and a 
newsletter.
•  Relations with PCPS—coordination of programs with the PCPS.
ENHANCING PUBLIC AWARENESS
Initiatives to enhance the public understanding of the SECPS and the 
Division for CPA Firms and to clarify the concept of self-regulation 
relate to the need to—
1. Achieve wider public awareness of the objectives, scope, and 
limitations of self-regulation; and
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2. Attain wider public dissemination of information on the results 
achieved.
A broad-based, continuing public-information program is required to 
achieve better understanding by all parties concerned of the objectives, 
scope, limitations, and results of self-regulation, which is essential if 
expectations are to be brought into line with the realities of self-regulation. 
Such a program should, of course, be directed primarily at those with 
an interest in the financial reporting process.
To date, neither the AICPA nor the SECPS has undertaken an effective 
program to inform the financial community of what is being done by 
way of self-regulation and of the significance of membership in the 
SECPS. Many members of the section have pointed to the desirability of 
such a program.
In an address to AICPA Council in May 1983, John J. McCloy, 
chairman of the POB, stated that
The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program is perhaps one of its 
best-kept secrets. Bankers, financial analysts, businessmen in general and 
perhaps even the majority of clients know very little about this constructive 
program on which the profession has embarked.11
All of the groups that Mr. McCloy mentioned need to be informed of 
the profession’s programs and the role and significance of the division. 
Membership in the SECPS should emphasize to the public a firm’s 
commitment to maintaining a high level of quality in its practice. A well- 
conceived public information program should help to educate the 
financial community about the nature and significance of peer review, 
the commitment to a high quality of practice by member firms, and the 
special requirements for members of the SECPS.
The POB in its 1983 annual report highlighted the need for a public 
information program, stating that “the subject of education and public 
relations merits urgent attention.” 12 According to the POB, such a 
program would have multiple benefits.
Efforts to inform users of financial statements and others about this program 
appear to offer many rewards. Not only would such efforts improve the 
credibility of the profession, but they might also increase membership. If 
public awareness were increased, some firms that now are unwilling to incur 
peer review costs and meet other membership requirements would likely 
find it in their best interest to do so. This in turn would increase the 
effectiveness of the program.
It should also be possible to educate nonmembers and the public about 
the differences between self-regulation and governmental regulation, and 
point out that self-regulation emphasizes preventive and corrective rather 
than punitive action.13
11. John J. McCloy, “Accomplishments of the SECPS: the POB’s Assessment,’’ 
Journal of Accountancy (August 1983), pp. 56—65.
12. Public Oversight Board, Annual Report 1982—83, p. 17.
13. Ibid.
20
We agree with the POB that the subject of education and public relations 
merits prompt and effective attention. For the profession to receive the 
recognition that the programs of the division merit, the financial com­
munity must be made aware of all important aspects of those programs.
Recommendation : An effective public information program should 
be developed and implemented. It should be designed to achieve 
better and broader public understanding of the objectives and scope 
of self-regulation, of the significance of membership in the SECPS 
and PCPS, and of the nature, objectives, and results of the programs 
of the two sections.
A related concern is that the public is not aware of remedial and 
corrective actions that member firms have taken as a result of the peer 
review program and the investigative process, including the disciplinary 
actions that firms take with respect to individuals as a result of those 
processes and their own internal quality-control programs. In its 1982— 
83 annual report, the POB stressed the need to make the public aware 
of how the self-regulatory processes work.
The division deserves to be commended for its accomplishments in fostering 
the highest quality of auditing and accounting practice by its member firms. 
Yet, those accomplishments are virtually unknown by either the public that 
benefits most from them or significant segments of the profession itself.
The public is not aware that the peer review and special investigative 
processes materially reduce the potential for audit failure. In the opinion 
of the Board, these two important aspects of the program have in fact 
reduced the number of audit failures by fostering and improving quality 
control systems of firms belonging to the division. The Board believes that 
those who doubt the objectivity of the section’s peer review and special 
investigative processes would be favorably impressed if they were made 
more aware of how these processes operate and what they have accom­
plished.14
The lack of awareness and understanding of the objectives of self­
regulation contributes to the view that self-regulation is not rigorously 
administered and is not functioning effectively because it has not resulted 
in public announcements of the imposition of sanctions on firms found 
to have deficiencies. A better understanding is needed, both of the 
respective roles of self-regulation and public regulation and of self­
regulation as a program designed to identify and correct deficiencies to 
minimize future problems. This awareness can be increased by publishing 
information on what is being done to reduce the potential for audit 
failures by way of peer review and the investigative process.
Recommendation: The SECPS should issue periodic public reports 
providing information to the public on the scope and results of the 
peer review program and the investigative process, including infor-
14. Ibid., p. 19.
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mation on the resulting remedial and corrective actions that member 
firms are required to take, without disclosing information on indi­
vidual firms or breaching the confidentiality of information reported 
to, or otherwise obtained by, the special investigations committee.
The recommendations later in this report on sanctions and on the 
investigative process complement and expand this recommendation.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
In our review, we considered the composition, structure, and effectiveness 
of the POB and possible initiatives to enhance its credibility and visibility.
The board and its staff have been successful in monitoring the peer 
review program and the investigative process, suggesting improvements 
to the system of self-regulation, and in reporting on and explaining the 
system before regulatory bodies. The concept of public oversight con­
ducted by individuals of established integrity and high reputation has 
proven to be an essential element of the system of self-regulation. The 
credibility of the board has been a central factor in gaining public 
acceptability for self-regulation and in assuring regulatory bodies and 
the public that the profession is committed to self-regulation and that 
the section’s program is effective.
The POB’s public visibility is increasing. Wider dissemination of its 
annual reports, the issuance of press releases, the acceptance of additional 
speaking and writing engagements by its members, and similar activities 
would further enhance the credibility of the program. In addition, the 
POB should meet periodically with the executive committee to review 
and evaluate the effectiveness of the section’s programs. Also, we note 
that the POB recently met with the AICPA Board of Directors; we 
suggest that such joint meetings be held periodically.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The executive committee is the governing and policy-setting body for 
the SECPS and, accordingly, has a vital role in the profession’s program 
of self-regulation. The effectiveness of the programs of the SECPS 
depends heavily on the quality of its executive committee’s leadership 
and direction. In our review of the executive committee, we considered 
its size and composition, the method of selecting its members, its 
responsibility for communication both within and outside the section, 
and its authority to impose sanctions.
SIZE AND COMPOSITION
We considered whether the size of the executive committee and the 
method of selecting its members were appropriate to current conditions 
and concluded that they are satisfactory. The committee was established 
with its present size and composition to assure that the program would
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be administered by a broad-based body of peers and that those most 
involved in SEC practice would have an opportunity to express their 
views. We see no reason for change.
The practices that individual firms follow in designating individuals 
to represent them on the executive committee vary. We noted that, 
occasionally, the inability of some members to speak authoritatively for 
their firm made timely action by the committee more difficult. Moreover, 
some designated representatives are too often represented at meetings 
by alternates, who find it difficult to participate effectively in the 
committee’s discussions and its decision-making process. The result is 
some inconsistency in the productivity of meetings of the executive 
committee. Senior personnel and continuity of representation are essen­
tial to the effectiveness of the committee in carrying out its role.
The executive committee is intended to be a group of peers who 
administer a program of vital significance to the profession. It deserves 
the highest possible level of participation. Each firm with membership 
on the committee should be represented by its chief executive or a very 
senior level partner, and each designated representative should make 
every effort to attend all meetings of the committee to provide the 
authority, continuity, and consistency required by the program.
Recommendation: Each firm represented on the executive committee 
should designate as its representative a member of the firm who can, 
with timely notice, speak authoritatively for the firm on policy issues, 
and the designated representative should consider attendance at 
meetings o f the executive committee to be a professional obligation. 
Designated representatives who do not have reasonable assurance of 
being able to attend meetings on a regular basis should consider 
having their alternates present at all meetings, regardless of whether 
or not the representative attends.
Adherence to such a policy should enhance the authority of the executive 
committee and increase its effectiveness.
COMMUNICATION
Some of those we interviewed were not satisfied with the level and 
effectiveness of communication among the various components of the 
SECPS and between those components and AICPA units outside the 
section. The executive committee should review and monitor the effec­
tiveness of communication within the section, with other AICPA com­
ponents, and with the POB. We considered, for example, whether there 
should be more communication between the peer review committee and 
the special investigations committee and between those committees and 
the executive committee. We concluded that communications along those 
channels can and should be improved. The two major activities within 
the section—peer review and investigation—have a common aim: to 
improve the quality of practice of member firms. For that reason, there 
needs to be more substantive communication between the two groups 
conducting those programs and between those groups and the executive 
committee.
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The executive committee should maintain an active oversight of the 
peer review and special investigations committees and be well-informed 
about the remedial or corrective actions that result from the peer review 
program and the investigative process. Those types of actions should be 
recognized and emphasized as the primary means by which the objectives 
of the section are achieved.
The executive committee recently began receiving more comprehensive 
information about the results of the peer review program. However, we 
are informed that the executive committee receives only limited infor­
mation on the activities of the special investigations committee, usually 
through reports by the staff and by representatives of the POB. The 
executive committee should receive reports, on a regular basis, directly 
from the chairman of the special investigations committee or a designee.
Recommendation; The executive committee should continue to 
receive current and comprehensive reports from the peer review 
committee and should arrange to obtain more comprehensive re­
porting directly from the special investigations committee on its 
activities.
SANCTIONS AGAINST MEMBER FIRMS
The executive committee has the authority to formally impose sanctions 
on member firms, either on its own initiative or on the basis of 
recommendations of the peer review committee or the special investi­
gations committee. Experience to date has been that such formal action 
has not been required and that the objectives of the section have been 
served through the voluntary cooperation of members in undertaking 
remedial or corrective action when deficiencies have been found. Such 
cooperation, based on mutual professional respect, is essential to the 
viability of the profession’s system of self-regulation. The actions that 
member firms are required to take to correct deficiencies constitute the 
most effective means available to the section to achieve its objectives.
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, formal sanctions by the 
executive committee may be imposed when a member firm—
1. Refuses to abide by the membership requirements.
2. Refuses to cooperate with the peer review committee or to take 
corrective action recommended as a result of a peer review.
3. Refuses to cooperate with the special investigations committee 
or to take corrective action recommended by that committee.
4. Commits an egregious act for which corrective action is an 
inadequate response.
In such circumstances, the principal sanctions available to the executive 
committee are censures, suspensions, or expulsions of members.
The executive committee has adopted formal rules of procedure for 
the imposition of sanctions, which give due consideration to the need 
for the protection of a firm’s rights in such a process.
Although some terminations of membership have resulted from fail­
ures to comply with the section’s membership requirements, the executive
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committee has not yet conducted a formal hearing to censure, suspend, 
or expel a member. The nature of the deficiencies found and the 
response of member firms in taking remedial and corrective actions as 
a result of the peer review program and the investigative process have 
been such as to not require further action. As previously noted, remedial 
or corrective actions are the primary means that the SECPS uses to 
correct deficiencies and to prevent the recurrence of such problems in 
the future. Member firms have been abiding by the membership require­
ments and have cooperated with the peer review committee and the 
special investigations committee by taking appropriate remedial or 
corrective actions regarding their quality control systems. They have 
agreed to have their actions verified by accelerated peer reviews, revisits 
by peer reviewers, or special peer reviews. The costs associated with such 
actions, which are borne by the firms involved, are significant. An open 
and rigorous peer review process that is accompanied by the prompt 
follow-up and correction of noted dehciencies—which may include 
additional education and training, reassignment, restriction on assign­
ments, or dismissal from the firm for one or more of a firm’s partners 
or professional staff—is the most effective approach.
In considering the role of sanctions in the SECPS, self-regulation must 
be kept in its proper perspective. For example, when deficiencies in the 
performance of a member firm in auditing the financial statements of 
SEC registrants are alleged in litigation, two forms of regulation come 
into play. One form is potential punitive action relating to the specific 
case through the actions of regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, or 
through the operation of the judicial system, or through both. The other 
is potential corrective or remedial action through the self-regulatory 
steps of the SECPS, whose objective is to determine whether corrective 
measures are necessary on the part of the member firm involved so that 
deficiencies that may have existed will be corrected and future problems 
avoided. Sanctions by the SECPS may be necessary only when member 
firms refuse to take such corrective action or when corrective action 
alone is not sufficient.
The use of the term “sanctions” and the underlying concept are 
appropriate in that context to describe the disciplinary process in the 
SECPS. What is needed is a clearer communication to the public of the 
differences in application and in the purpose of (1) the sanctions applied 
by governmental regulatory agencies and the courts on the basis of 
statutory authority and (2) the actions called for by a voluntary, self- 
regulatory organization for the purpose of improving the professional 
performance of its members. A collateral need is for more information 
to the public about the activities of the special investigations committee, 
as recommended elsewhere in this report.
To help achieve a better public understanding, the executive committee 
should clarify the conditions under which it would generally impose 
sanctions. The clarification should stress that member firms are expected 
to and do undertake corrective action when deficiencies are found, that 
the emphasis is on correcting deficiencies and preventing breakdowns 
in the quality control systems of member firms, and that sanctions, such 
as censures, suspensions, and expulsions, are called for and will be used 
in the circumstances stated above.
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Recommendation: The executive committee should issue a statement 
of policy on the use of its authority to impose sanctions. The statement 
should emphasize that member firms agree to abide by the member­
ship requirements and to undertake corrective actions for deficiencies 
identified in their quality control system or in their compliance with 
those systems, that they may be (and have been) required to undergo 
accelerated or special peer reviews or investigations by the peer 
review or special investigations committees, and that sanctions are 
generally reserved for situations in which a firm refuses to take 
necessary or required actions or otherwise refuses to cooperate with 
the section or in which a firm is found to have committed an 
egregious act for which corrective action alone would be an inade­
quate response.
Such a statement of policy on the use of the authority to impose sanctions 
should keep the emphasis on positive, forward-looking actions directed 
at improving the quality of practice.
THE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
In our review of the peer review program, we considered its effectiveness 
in improving the quality of audit practice, the costs and benefits of peer 
reviews, the consideration that should be given to litigation in determining 
the scope of a peer review, the extent to which peer reviews should 
evaluate the effectiveness of second-partner reviews, and what might be 
done, if anything, to dispel the expectation that peer reviews should 
prevent all audit failures.
EFFECTIVENESS OF PEER REVIEWS
The evidence available to us indicates that the peer review program is 
working well and has proved beneficial to member firms and the public. 
The written comments that we received from member firms almost 
uniformly praised the benefits of peer review, but questions were raised 
about the cost of the program and how it might be reduced. The statistics 
on peer review summarized in Appendix A of this report indicate that 
most member firms are now undergoing or preparing for their second 
and some for their third review.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate through empirical 
evidence the extent to which peer reviews have improved the quality of 
accounting and audit practice. Improvements that can be identified may 
also be attributable to other factors such as new professional standards 
and guidance material, changes in personnel, and participation in training 
programs. However, we are convinced that the process has improved 
the quality of practice, heightened awareness of the importance of quality 
control policies and procedures throughout the profession, and reduced 
the potential for audit failures. To support that view, we must rely largely 
on the subjective judgments of participants and those assigned to an 
oversight role and on our own evaluation of information and views 
presented to us.
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The POB, through its presence and its activities, helps to assure the 
effectiveness of the peer review program; it has consistently praised the 
program in its annual reports. The SEC, in its 1982 report to Congress 
on its oversight of the accounting profession, stated that “although peer 
reviews provide no assurance that all audit failure will be identified in 
the future, any audit failures that occur should be due to isolated 
breakdowns or ‘people problems,’ and not to inherent deficiencies in 
firms’ systems of quality control.”15
The quality control systems of firms and the peer reviews of those 
systems should not be expected to eliminate the possibility of an audit 
failure from an isolated breakdown in the system or from “people 
problems.” Although alleged failures receive considerable publicity, the 
cases reported are relatively few. Of an estimated 50,000 audits of public 
companies since the formation of the section’s special investigations 
committee in 1979, only eighty-two situations involving alleged audit 
failure have been reported to that committee.
The review of the quality control system is designed to determine 
whether an appropriate system is in place and functioning properly and 
to correct deficiencies if any are found. A properly functioning system 
cannot guarantee that a firm will never experience “people problems” 
in audit engagements, but it does help to minimize the possibility of such 
problems. Quality control standards require a firm to establish policies 
and procedures for, among other things, the following:
•  Hiring—to provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel 
possess the appropriate characteristics to enable them to perform 
competently.
•  Professional development—to provide reasonable assurance that 
firm personnel will have the knowledge required to enable them 
to fulfill assigned responsibilities.
•  Assigning personnel to engagements—to provide reasonable assur­
ance that the work is performed by persons having the degree 
of technical training and proficiency required.
•  Supervision—to provide reasonable assurance that performance 
meets the firm’s standards.
•  Advancement—to provide reasonable assurance that those selected 
for advancement will have the qualifications necessary for ful­
fillment of the responsibilities they will be called on to assume.
By determining whether such policies and procedures are in place and 
functioning, peer reviews help to assure objectivity, competence, and 
integrity in the conduct of audits.
In addition, any questions raised in peer reviews about the compliance 
of individuals with the rules of professional conduct are referred to the 
Institute’s professional ethics division for its consideration. Inspection
15. Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).
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programs within firms are also concerned with the professional behavior 
of individuals, and those programs interrelate with peer reviews. As a 
result of a firm’s internal procedures, individuals, regardless of their 
level in the firm, may be reassigned, restricted as to the type of work 
that they can perform, or dismissed if serious questions arise as to their 
competence, integrity, or professional performance.
We encourage continuing and enhanced emphasis in peer review and 
inspection programs on firms’ policies and procedures relating to hiring, 
professional development, assigning personnel to engagements, super­
vision, and advancement. Consideration should be given to whether 
more can be done in peer reviews and in firms’ inspection programs to 
address what has been described as “people problems.” As discussed 
below, we also encourage greater emphasis in peer review on determining 
the effectiveness of second-partner reviews.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Several firms cited the cost of peer reviews as their principal concern in 
their written comments to us. The cost of peer review is substantial both 
in terms of fees paid to reviewers and time devoted internally by reviewed 
firms to the review process. Some firms believe that the cost-benefit 
relationship becomes more unfavorable as a firm undergoes its second 
and subsequent peer reviews, particularly when no significant deficiencies 
were found in earlier reviews. Further, the benefits are highly intangible 
and difficult to measure. However, the benefits are to be found in the 
improved quality of practice, the heightened prestige and credibility of 
the profession, and the enhanced personal pride and satisfaction of 
practitioners as professionals. We believe these benefits are present, even 
though difficult to quantify, and that they justify the costs incurred, both 
in time and money.
PEER REVIEW TIME INTERVAL
Some firms have questioned the need for a member firm to undergo a 
peer review every three years, particularly where two reviews have been 
conducted and no serious deficiencies have been found. Extending the 
interval has been proposed as a means of reducing the cost of peer 
review. An SECPS task force on membership requirements considered 
the issue in 1981 and recommended extending the length of the interval 
beyond the present three-year period. The executive committee rejected 
that recommendation. The POB opposed, and continues to oppose, any 
extension of the interval. It expressed the view that an extension “would 
have decreased, or would have been perceived to have decreased, the 
effectiveness of the process.”16
We are sympathetic to efforts to reduce the cost of peer reviews. 
However, we agree with the POB that extending the interval or making 
fundamental changes in the peer review program not only may limit its
16. Public Oversight Board, Annual Report, 1982—83, p. 17. 
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effectiveness but, further, might serve to weaken public perception o f  
the profession’s com m itm ent to quality control, because experience with 
the program  is still relatively limited.
Recommendation : The three-year interval for peer reviews should 
be retained and no other fundamental changes should be made in 
peer review procedures that might be perceived as a lessening of 
the commitment to the profession’s program of self-regulation. The 
executive committee should continue to review periodically the 
appropriateness of the time interval for peer review and other aspects 
of the program as more experience is gained.
LITIGATION AND THE SCOPE OF PEER REVIEWS
An issue resolved by the SECPS during our review relates to the 
consideration that should be given to litigation in determ ining the scope 
o f  a peer review. On the recom m endation o f  the special investigations 
com m ittee and o f  the POB that such consideration be made a formal 
peer review requirem ent, the executive comm ittee and the peer review  
com m ittee have agreed to im plem ent that suggestion. We support that 
decision.
SECOND-PARTNER REVIEWS
T he SECPS’s m em bership requirements call for a concurring second- 
partner review o f  the audit report on each SEC engagem ent by a partner 
other than the partner in charge o f  the engagem ent before issuance o f  
the report. However, except for the mandate to review compliance with 
the m em bership requirements, there is nothing in the standards for peer 
review or the related guidance material that would require an evaluation 
o f  the scope and effectiveness o f  such a review. We consider such an 
evaluation to be an important part o f  a peer review.
Recommendation: The SECPS Executive Committee should strengthen 
standards for what constitutes a second-partner review in SEC 
engagements so that both member firms and peer reviewers have a 
better understanding of what is expected. The standards should 
address matters such as the qualifications of the second partner, the 
general scope and extent of the review, and the record of the review.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
T he special investigations comm ittee was established in recognition o f  
the significant public interest in those situations that tend to adversely 
affect the public’s confidence in the reliability o f  the financial statements 
o f  SEC registrants and the efficacy o f  the audit process. Concurrent with 
the establishment o f  the comm ittee, guidelines were adopted that were 
intended to achieve a balance between the public interest and the legal 
rights o f  m em ber firms. In our review o f  the comm ittee, we addressed  
questions relating to its mandate and authority, its ability to investigate 
cases, the confidentiality surrounding its operations, the reporting re-
29
quirem ent for m em ber firms, and its relations with the other com ponents 
o f  the SECPS and the AICPA.
In our opinion, the special investigations committee has operated  
effectively within the guidelines established by the executive comm ittee 
and has determ ined whether facts relating to alleged audit failures 
indicate the need for corrective action by m em ber firms or for changes 
in professional standards.
STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY
T he special investigations comm ittee has perform ed a difficult assignm ent 
in a creditable manner. A lthough the comm ittee takes various actions as 
deem ed appropriate in connection with m em ber firms involved in 
litigation in which an audit failure is alleged, the practicality o f  legal 
constraints inherent in self-regulation prevents the comm ittee, as pres­
ently constituted in the private sector, from  acting effectively as a quasi­
judicial body in conducting an “investigation o f  a case.” It is limited in 
its capacity because it does not have (1) a legislative mandate, (2) the 
power o f  subpoena, (3) the right to exam ine or cross-examine witnesses, 
and (4) the ability to com pel m em ber firms or their clients to make 
available evidence relating to litigation. Member firms have certain rights 
and legitim ate interests concerning litigation involving the firm. M ore­
over, the cases reported to the comm ittee are often concurrently under  
investigation by the SEC or other regulatory bodies.
T he com m ittee’s organizational docum ent recognizes that considera­
tion should be given to the substantial prejudice against a firm or 
individuals in the firm that could develop if  it were to com m ence and  
continue an investigation o f  the working papers and related evidence in 
a specific case while the firm or individuals in it are involved, or about 
to be involved, in a court proceeding or a proceeding or investigation 
by the SEC, a grand jury, or other governmental body. By the time those 
processes are com pleted and conclusions have been reached, direct 
investigation o f  the evidence in the case by the comm ittee to determ ine 
whether there have been deficiencies in auditing would be largely 
untimely and irrelevant.
In rare cases, the special investigations comm ittee has the authority, 
with the approval o f  the executive comm ittee, to investigate directly the 
working papers and other evidence in specific cases involved in litigation. 
However, such action has not been feasible for the reasons stated above 
and as further explained in the com m ittee’s organizational docum ent. 
T he com m ittee has screened and m onitored such cases and has conducted  
special investigations o f  m em ber firms involved in some o f  those cases. 
T hese investigations have consisted o f  attem pting to find out as m uch  
as possible about the case from  public docum ents and from  the member 
firm on a voluntary basis and o f  perform ing special reviews o f  one or 
m ore areas that are related to the case, such as specific offices or 
individuals, certain industry specialities, or specific quality control policies 
and procedures. Such investigations, which are essentially special peer 
reviews, are intended to be preventive rather than punitive and to 
determ ine whether corrective action has been taken or should be taken
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by m em ber firms to improve the quality o f  their professional practice 
and to help prevent such occurrences in the future. Member firms 
involved have cooperated with the committee and, in all instances, have 
taken recom m ended actions.
T he com m ittee’s organizational docum ent draws a distinction between  
the “investigation o f  a firm” and the “investigation o f  a case.” T he form er 
is what the com m ittee has been doing in practice whenever it goes beyond  
screening and m onitoring. T he latter involves a direct investigation o f  
the working papers and other evidence in a specific case, which, for 
reasons we consider valid, the comm ittee has not undertaken.
Since all o f  the activities o f  the committee are a form  o f  investigation  
and result from  and relate to cases in litigation, confusion m ight be 
avoided by elim inating the terms, “investigation o f  a case” and “investi­
gation o f  a firm.” Instead, the organizational docum ent should be revised 
to reflect the concept that the committee will take whatever action is 
deem ed appropriate in the circumstances with respect to each case 
reported to it. T he investigative process would still involve screening, 
m onitoring, and, whenever necessary, additional investigation. T he  
com m ittee would decide the scope o f  the investigation in each case, after 
considering all the facts and circumstances, which would probably be 
along the lines that the comm ittee has been following in practice.
O ne o f  the general m em bership requirements states that m em ber 
firms should cooperate with the special investigations committee. H ow­
ever, there has been no specific requirem ent that firms provide infor­
mation about the issues involved in a case in litigation beyond what is 
publicly available. W hile inform ation has been obtained on a voluntary 
basis, when requested by the comm ittee, that basis is too tenuous if  the 
com m ittee is to have the necessary credibility to carry out its mission 
successfully. M ember firms should be required to make available sufficient 
inform ation (but not the working papers or other direct evidence in a 
specific case) so that the com m ittee can decide whether to conduct a 
timely review o f  pertinent aspects o f  the firm’s organization and quality 
control system to determ ine whether corrective action on the part o f  the 
firm is necessary. T o be consistent with that approach, sanctions would  
be im posed on m em ber firms if  they either refuse to cooperate in the 
m anner described above or refuse to take the necessary corrective action 
as requested by the comm ittee.
Recommendation : The organizational document of the special in­
vestigations committee should be revised: (1) to describe the com­
mittee’s investigative authority based on the concept that member 
firms should be required to furnish sufficient information (but not 
the working papers or other direct evidence in a specific case) so 
that the committee can determine whether special reviews of the 
quality control system of the firm are necessary to enable it to 
determine whether any corrective action, beyond what the member 
firm may have already undertaken, is necessary; (2) to eliminate the 
terms “an investigation of a case” and “an investigation of a firm,” 
as descriptions o f different modes of the committee’s investigative 
activities; and (3) to indicate that the committee is authorized to
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recommend sanctions to the executive committee in cases in which 
a member firm refuses to cooperate or to take any corrective action 
requested.
T he special investigations com m ittee’s organizational docum ent is 
om itted from  the SECPS manual and is not readily available in any other 
publication o f  the section. This omission has contributed to the confusion  
concerning the role o f  the comm ittee. T he docum ent should be included  
in the manual.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
In the discussion elsewhere in this report (pages 19—22) o f  the need to 
enhance public awareness o f  self-regulation, we recom m end that some 
degree o f  public disclosure relating to remedial and corrective action in 
the peer review and investigative processes should be considered. In our 
review o f  the special investigations comm ittee, we addressed the question  
o f  whether the confidentiality o f  its activities should be m odified to 
provide SEC access as well as to permit public disclosure o f  inform ation  
on the actions resulting from  the process.
Because o f  the possible prejudice against m em ber firms in the pro­
ceedings o f  the special investigations comm ittee and on the advice o f  
legal counsel, the executive comm ittee originally decided that the activities 
o f  the special investigations comm ittee should be conducted under  
conditions o f  confidentiality. Accordingly, although there have been  
highly publicized instances o f  alleged audit failure, only general infor­
mation about the com m ittee’s activities has been released. T he public is 
largely unaware o f  the actions taken by the com m ittee and the remedial 
and corrective measures that have resulted.
Confidentiality on matters relating to specific cases still appears to be 
desirable because o f  the voluntary nature o f  the SECPS, the possibility 
o f  substantial and often unwarranted prejudice against m em ber firms, 
and the fact that the public interest has been adequately protected by 
the procedures followed by the com m ittee and the regulatory and court 
processes. However, som e public inform ation about the actions taken in 
the investigative process is needed to enhance the credibility o f  the 
process. T he com m ittee should periodically report to the public on its 
activities using a form at that would not identify firms or cases and that 
m ight encom pass, at least, the following:
•  A description o f  the com m ittee’s operations, o f  its objectives, and  
o f  the m eans used to assure compliance.
•  Aggregated data and statistics on the num ber and types o f  cases 
reported, closed, and still active.
•  Aggregated data and statistics on the num ber and types o f  
remedial or corrective actions taken voluntarily by firms, either 
on their own initiatives or as a result o f  the investigative process.
•  A discussion o f  unusual matters encountered in the process.
•  Inform ation on closed cases, describing by general categories the 
reasons for closing the cases.
32
•  Data on, and discussions of, matters referred to standard-setting 
bodies.
Such a report would provide the public and the SEC with inform ation  
about the investigative process that should enhance its credibility.
Recommendation : The special investigations committee should issue 
at least annually a public report on its activities covering at a 
minimum the types o f information indicated above.
In addition to developing a format for public reporting, the SECPS 
should consider providing the profession with educational materials 
based on findings in the investigative process. T he inform ation developed  
and the conclusions reached in the investigative process on the nature 
o f  the facts and circumstances that contribute to allegations o f  audit 
failure in specific cases can be the source o f  valuable educational material 
for the profession and should be accumulated and distributed. T he  
com m ittee should accumulate relevant inform ation relating to the matters 
on its agenda and periodically have analyses o f  such inform ation prepared  
and dissem inated for the education o f  the profession, without breaching 
the essential confidentiality o f  the process.
Recommendation: The SECPS should make available in a manner 
appropriate for educational purposes information about unusual or 
recurring problems encountered in the investigative process.
Member firms, other firms, regulators, academics, and others would  
benefit from  the availability o f  such information.
REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBER FIRMS
We considered whether the requirem ent for m em ber firms to report 
certain litigation to the special investigations com m ittee should be ex ­
panded to include cases involving non-SEC registrants in which there is 
a significant public interest and obtained the advice o f  counsel on legal 
considerations that m ight be involved. As previously indicated, the 
investigative and peer review processes are similar in that both are 
intended to help m em ber firms attain and maintain appropriate quality 
control. For that reason, we believe it is time to reconsider the requirem ent 
that only litigation involving SEC registrants be reported.
A quality control deficiency that results in an audit failure relating to 
a client that is not an SEC registrant could, in the absence o f  som e 
additional special safeguards, have the same result in connection with 
the audit o f  an SEC registrant. T he comm ittee, in the past, has added  
to its agenda a limited num ber o f  cases involving entities that are not 
SEC registrants. Because o f  the construction o f  the reporting require­
m ent, it was found necessary in such instances to approach the firms 
involved and encourage them  to report such matters voluntarily.
A lthough that approach worked in those instances, the efficacy o f  the 
process and the public credibility it obtains would be enhanced if  the 
reporting requirem ent was broadened. Ideally, it could be argued that 
all alleged audit failures should be reported; however, since the primary 
thrust o f  the SECPS relates to the im provem ent o f  the quality o f  practice
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before the SEC, we conclude that the requirem ent should only be 
broadened to include cases involving entities that, although not SEC 
registrants, are o f  such interest to the general and financial public that 
a distinction between them  and SEC registrants should not be made. 
O ne approach, for exam ple, would be to broaden the present requirem ent 
to cover reporting cases against a firm or its personnel that involve non- 
SEC clients or form er clients with $50 million or more in total assets. 
Such a provision should be adequate to cover most non-SEC registrants 
in which there is a sufficient public interest, such as banks, savings and  
loan associations, insurance companies, and brokers and dealers in 
securities. However, m ore study is needed to arrive at a definitive 
statement o f  the requirement.
Recommendation : The membership requirement for reporting cases 
to the special investigations committee should be extended to cover 
cases involving all entities in which there is a significant public 
interest.
COSTS OF INVESTIGATIONS
We considered whether the cost o f  an investigation should be borne by 
the investigated firm. T o date, investigations o f  firms, which are essentially 
special peer reviews o f  certain aspects o f  a firm’s quality controls, have 
been conducted by a special task force or by the investigated firm’s peer 
reviewers. T he costs o f  reviews conducted by a special task force have 
been borne by the section, while the costs o f  reviews conducted by the 
investigated firms’ peer reviewers have been borne by the firm. We see 
no reasons why the costs o f  both types o f  reviews should not be handled  
in the same manner.
Recommendation: The cost of a special peer review conducted in 
an investigation of a firm should be borne by the investigated firm 
without regard to whether the review is conducted by the firm’s peer 
reviewers or by a special task force.
T he adoption o f  that policy would make the process m ore equitable. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL STANDARDS
An issue brought to our attention relates to whether there is a need to 
improve com m unications between the special investigations com m ittee 
and standard-setting bodies with respect to the implications for accounting  
and auditing standards that are brought to light in investigations o f  
instances o f  alleged audit failure. It is important that the com m ittee 
continue and intensify its efforts to identify and comm unicate promptly 
any such implications. T he executive comm ittee should review and assess 
the adequacy o f  existing liaison arrangements with the Auditing Stand­
ards Board and the Accounting Standards Executive Committee.
SIZE AND COMPOSITION
We also considered the size and com position o f  the com m ittee and the 
qualifications to serve on it. For exam ple, we considered whether
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m em bership on the com m ittee should be limited to active partners o f  
CPA firms or whether there should be some predeterm ined ratio o f  
active and retired partners. Some persons contend that to make the 
investigative process m ore effective, the committee should be com posed  
only o f  active partners. We disagree with that view. T he advantages o f  
having retired partners serve on the committee relate to their experience, 
objectivity, com m itm ent, and ability to devote the necessary time to the 
com m ittee’s activities. At present, five o f  the nine members o f  the 
com m ittee are retired partners, and the chairman is an active partner. 
Such a m ix o f  retired and active partners is reasonable.
MEMBERSHIP
We considered the level o f  SECPS membership in relation to the total 
number o f  firms with SEC clients and whether, as som e have suggested, 
m em bership should be restricted to firms that have SEC practices. T he  
level o f  m em bership is reasonable for a voluntary program. However, 
we encourage continuation o f  vigorous efforts to attract as members all 
firms with SEC clients, especially those that have chosen to jo in  only the 
PCPS. T he im plem entation o f the recom m endations in this report for 
wider publicity about the section should help to make such efforts more 
fruitful. Also, firms that do not have SEC practices should continue to 
be allowed and encouraged to be members o f  the SECPS.
We reviewed the m em bership requirements o f  the section and found  
them  to be satisfactory.
PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE THE BENEFITS OF 
MEMBERSHIP
Other matters that came to our attention relate broadly to what can be 
described as the need to establish and broaden programs to enhance 
benefits o f  m em bership and to enhance the professional com petence o f  
members. T h e possibilities considered include im plem enting the section’s 
objective to provide technical inform ation on SEC practice and additional 
m em ber services such as an annual m eeting and a newsletter.
PROVIDING TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON SEC 
PRACTICE
T he objectives o f  the SECPS, as stated in its organizational docum ent, 
establish its goals and provide criteria for evaluating its perform ance. In 
our review and evaluation, we considered whether the stated objectives 
should be m odified and conclude that they remain appropriate.
One o f  the stated objectives o f  the SECPS is to provide a forum  for 
the developm ent o f  technical inform ation relating to SEC practice. T he  
section has done little to im plem ent that objective, and som e o f  the 
written com m ents we received from  member firms suggest that the 
section should do more. Our recom m endations that follow for an annual 
m eeting and for a newsletter should help to fill that need.
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ANNUAL MEETINGS
In considering ways to enhance the benefits o f  m em bership, we discussed 
the desirability o f  annual m eetings o f  SECPS member firms. Based on  
their written com m ents to us, at least some member firms believe that 
an annual m eeting is desirable and others stress the need for im proved  
comm unications am ong m em ber firms. Annual m eetings o f  m em ber 
firms could serve as forum s for discussions o f  technical and professional 
matters o f  com m on interest to members and would help to reinforce the 
sense o f  participation with peers in a program o f  self-regulation and  
self-im provem ent. Such m eetings should be designed to help achieve the 
primary objective o f  the section, that is, to improve the quality o f  practice 
before the SEC. T he PCPS has held several annual conferences for its 
members. A similar program stressing technical and professional devel­
opm ents relating to SEC practice should be considered.
Recommendation : The SECPS should hold annual meetings of 
member firms as technical and professional forums on SEC practice 
matters. Such meetings should be rigorously evaluated to assure that 
they meet their purpose.
Our intent is not simply to add m ore m eetings nor, certainly, to establish 
a program that com petes with the PCPS conference or the annual 
AICPA—SEC conference or other meetings. Rather, it is to present a 
program designed to achieve specific objectives, a program that com ple­
ments other m eetings by em phasizing matters o f  special interest to SECPS 
m em ber firms and by providing opportunities for discussions o f  com m on  
problems.
NEWSLETTER
We believe that it would be desirable for the SECPS to issue a regular 
newsletter on its activities and on current professional and technical 
developm ents o f  particular interest to its members.
Recommendation; The SECPS should publish a quarterly newsletter 
for its members.
A regular newsletter could help to improve comm unication within the 
section.
COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE 
COMPANIES PRACTICE SECTION
T he Division for CPA Firms was established as two autonom ous and 
largely independent sections, the SECPS and the PCPS, in recognition  
o f  significant differences in the practices and needs o f  different types o f  
firms. T he two sections have developed similar programs aimed at 
im proving the accounting and audit practices o f  their m em ber firms. 
T he structure has worked well and has afforded firms o f  all sizes the 
opportunity to participate in the profession’s program o f  self-regulation. 
However, since the two sections share a com m on objective— to improve
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the quality o f  the accounting and audit practice in CPA firms, primarily 
by reliance on peer reviews— and since their basic structure, programs, 
and operations are similar, they need to work closely together to resolve 
com m on problems m ore effectively, such as the need to develop an 
effective public inform ation program. In the past, the two sections have 
cooperated through ad hoc groups to develop joint programs, but steps 
should be taken that will better prom ote and assure such cooperation.
T herefore, an organizational structure should be established to facil­
itate and encourage greater coordination between the two sections in 
identifying and dealing with com m on problems. We suggest that a 
standing coordinating comm ittee consisting o f  persons selected from  
members o f  the executive comm ittee o f  each section be form ed to 
accomplish that objective.
Recommendation: The executive committees of the SECPS and the 
PCPS should form a standing coordinating committee consisting of 
persons selected from members of the two executive committees 
with the responsibility of exploring ways to improve coordination 
between the two sections and to deal with common problems.
Such a coordinating com m ittee should consider ways to achieve a better 
understanding o f  com m on problems and recom m end solutions for 
consideration by the executive comm ittees o f  the two sections.
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chapter 6
SUMMATION
In this report, we present the opinions and conclusions reached in our 
review and evaluation o f  the SECPS. T he first six years o f  the section’s 
existence have seen significant accomplishments, but, most importantly, 
they have been a learning experience. T he SECPS has established 
programs to im prove the quality o f  practice o f  m em ber firms, which in 
their totality have proven to be a vital and successful aspect o f  the 
profession’s system o f  self-regulation. Our overall evaluation is that the 
SECPS’s programs and processes are functioning well. T he POB, an 
essential elem ent o f  the system o f  self-regulation, has been effective in 
m onitoring the section and in representing the public interest. T he SEC’s 
m onitoring o f  the section has been constructive and supportive. T he  
profession, the AICPA, and the participants in the section can take pride 
in the SECPS and in its results.
Despite our overall favorable evaluations o f  the SECPS and its programs 
and processes, we recom m end in this report a number o f  initiatives and  
actions to improve the section’s effectiveness. O ne o f  the central thrusts 
o f  those recom m endations relates to the need to inform  the public and 
various constituencies about the nature and results o f  a system o f  self­
regulation and to place it in its proper perspective. Other suggestions 
are intended to expand the benefits o f  m em bership and create programs 
to enhance professionalism  and to achieve greater coordination in the 
overall system o f  self-regulation.
We find that the accounting profession, a profession entrusted with 
the responsibility o f  regulating itself, is doing a creditable job o f  self­
regulation. We encourage all CPA firms with SEC clients and other firms 
to help further the program by join ing the SECPS.
Although the SECPS merits high marks on its perform ance to date, 
the profession cannot afford to be complacent about the results. In the 
long run, it will be judged  not by the particulars o f  its programs and its 
own analysis and evaluation o f  them, but by how effectively it perform s 
audits. H ence, the profession must continually m onitor and evaluate its 
own perform ance and, on a timely basis, take the steps that are necessary 
and appropriate to assure that the quality o f  that perform ance meets 
the needs o f  the public.
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APPENDIXES
appendix A
THE SECPS: DEVELOPMENT, 
STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND 
RESULTS
In this appendix, we review the events that led to the formation of the AICPA 
Division for CPA Firms, describe the present organizational structure of the 
SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the Division for CPA Firms and the operations 
of its major components, and review its activities during its first six years of 
operations. It is intended to provide background for the discussion and findings 
in the body of our report.
DEVELOPING A PROGRAM OF SELF-REGULATION 
FOR CPA FIRMS
The accounting profession, like other professions, provides designated services 
to the public, and there is a high level of public interest in the quality o f the 
services provided. Society has generally permitted the professions to establish 
and enforce the standards that regulate their members. The accounting profes­
sion has vigorously sought to protect its right to regulate itself and to retain 
public trust. The AICPA Division for CPA Firms was formed as a result o f such 
efforts. It was created in the latter half of the 1970s during a period in which 
the profession faced criticism of its performance and pressure to reform and 
strengthen all elements o f self-regulation.
ROLE OF THE AICPA
The Division for CPA Firms, consisting of the SECPS and the Private Companies 
Practice Section (PCPS), was created by the AICPA and is an integral part o f it. 
The AICPA is a voluntary professional association consisting of more than 
200,000 CPAs, about half of whom are engaged in the practice of public 
accounting. It has been the principal force in the self-regulation of CPAs for 
nearly a century since its formation in 1887. The AICPA derives most of its 
authority from its position as the national organization of CPAs and from its 
ability to admit individuals to membership and to suspend or expel them.1 Thus,
1. The state societies of CPAs, the voluntary professional organizations at the local level, are 
independent of the AICPA and have their own codes of professional ethics. Through their 
compliance and enforcement activities, they also play a significant role in self-regulation 
in close cooperation with the AICPA.
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until recently, it has been primarily concerned with the regulation of individual 
CPAs through its influence on education and entrance standards, through its 
role in developing technical standards, and through its code o f professional 
ethics. Not until 1977 did the AICPA establish an organizational structure for 
the regulation of CPA firms.
SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO CPA FIRMS
During the 1970s, the profession and the AICPA came under close scrutiny 
and criticism by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Among the areas o f major concern was the need for programs to monitor and 
improve the quality of accounting and audit practice in CPA firms. In response, 
the profession took initiatives to develop programs to improve its performance 
and to better meet public expectations, which led to the formation of the 
Division for CPA Firms.
A series o f developments and initiatives preceded the establishment of the 
division. In 1972, the SEC proposed that the Institute develop a program for 
reviewing the quality control systems of CPA firms practicing before the SEC. 
It sought to use such a review program in connection with SEC Rule 2(e) 
proceedings. In response, the Institute appointed an ad hoc committee that 
developed a program under which the Institute cooperated with the SEC by 
supplying reviewers for SEC-mandated reviews.2 Concurrently, the Institute 
developed a program for voluntary reviews of the quality control procedures 
of multi-office firms.3
Although the program for voluntary reviews did not gain wide acceptance, 
the Institute had recognized the significance of firms in the profession and the 
need to develop a structure for the self-regulation of CPA firms. In 1975, an 
Institute special committee studied the broad issue of self-regulation. The charge 
to that committee described the changes in the environment that were to be 
considered:
The public accounting profession’s organizational structure was established at a time 
when the largest national CPA firms were a great deal smaller than the present 
national and international giants. Practice was also less complex and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission did not appear on the scene until many years after the 
AICPA was organized. It is not surprising, therefore, that the profession’s structure 
was designed to provide for the regulation and discipline of individuals rather than 
practice units.
The emergence of  very large CPA firms and the explosive growth in the 
complexities of practice have resulted in questions being posed as to the need for 
regulation of firms. Accordingly, the appointment of a special committee has been 
authorized to study the present system of regulation of the profession to determine 
its adequacy in the light of today’s circumstances.
The special committee developed a comprehensive plan for voluntary regis­
tration of CPA firms found to have met certain quality control standards in 
their accounting and audit practices. The plan, revised to delete the registration 
provision requirement and to limit its application to firms with SEC practices,
2. AICPA, A Tentative Program for an Inspection of Quality Control Standards and Procedures of an 
Accounting Firm Pursuant to Rule 2 (e) of the SEC Rules of Practice (New York: AICPA, 1974).
3. AICPA, Special Committee to Study Quality Review for Multi-Office Firms, Plan for 
Implementation of AICPA Voluntary Program for Reviews of Quality Control Procedures of Multi- 
Office Firms (New York: AICPA, 1974).
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was approved by AICPA Council (the governing body of the Institute).4 The 
Council appointed a standing committee on quality control standards (later 
made a senior technical committee with the authority to issue standards for 
quality control for the accounting and audit practice of firms) to develop 
procedures for conducting reviews.5
By the time the voluntary quality control review program was in place, the 
Division for CPA Firms had been established with its own peer review committees, 
and the procedures developed for the voluntary program served as the 
foundation for the self-regulatory program of the Division for CPA Firms. The 
formation of the division represented a fundamental shift in the concept and 
focus o f self-regulation in the profession.
CREATION OF THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
In a July 1976 report, an Institute special committee, formed to study proposals 
to restructure the profession, proposed to the AICPA Board of Directors a 
membership structure within the Institute for CPA firms. The proposal was 
accepted, but no steps were taken immediately to implement it. In May 1977, 
the AICPA Board of Directors accepted a proposal that had been developed by 
an ad hoc group under the direction of the then AICPA chairman, Michael N. 
Chetkovich, and the then AICPA president, Wallace E. Olson, to establish a 
membership division for SEC practice firms and a membership division for 
private companies practice firms. AICPA Council approved a slightly modified 
version of that proposal in the fall of 1977 after extensive debate.
The Division for CPA Firms, which became operational in 1978, provides a 
voluntary organizational structure within the Institute for the self-regulation of 
CPA firms. It consists o f two autonomous and largely independent sections, 
SECPS, primarily for firms that practice before the SEC, and the PCPS. The 
sections are not exclusive; firms may join either or both without regard to 
whether they have SEC clients. The discussion in this appendix is generally 
limited to the SECPS, which is the section our committee was formed to study.
OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
OF THE SECPS
The SECPS is designed to provide the public with reasonable assurance that its 
members adhere to the standards of the profession in their accounting and 
audit practice, but especially in their practice before the SEC. Its structure and 
operating rules have evolved as experience was gained in implementing previ­
ously untried concepts and procedures.
OBJECTIVES
The current objectives of the SECPS incorporate the goals it seeks to achieve 
and provide criteria for evaluating its performance. The SECPS seeks
4. Discussion Draft, Proposed Plan for Voluntary Quality Control Review Program for CPA Firms 
with SEC Practices (New York: AICPA 1976).
5. The Quality Control Standards Committee was disbanded in 1983 upon its own request, 
since it could not identify a need for additional standards or interpretations. The Auditing 
Standards Board is now responsible for identifying emerging practice needs in this area.
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1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission through the establishment of practice require­
ments for member firms.
2. Establish and maintain an effective system of self-regulation of member 
firms by means of mandatory peer reviews, required maintenance of 
appropriate quality controls, and the imposition of sanctions for failure 
to meet membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system through 
the monitoring and evaluation activities of an independent oversight 
board composed of public members.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical information relating to 
SEC practice.
MAJOR COMPONENTS
The work of the SECPS is administered by three major committees (the executive 
committee, the peer review committee, and the special investigations committee) 
with the support o f AICPA staff, including the staff of the AICPA Quality 
Control Review Division (QCRD). The Public Oversight Board (POB), an 
independent organization composed primarily of non-CPAs and supported by 
its own staff, provides oversight of all the activities o f the section, reports to the 
public on those activities, and keeps the SEC informed in that regard.
The AICPA president designates staff for the components of the SECPS. 
Thomas P. Kelley, AICPA vice president-technical, has responsibility for staff 
support for the operations of all of the components of the section and personally 
provides the staff support to the executive committee. He is assisted by a 
technical manager, Arthur Renner, the major portion of whose time is devoted 
to providing staff support to the special investigations committee. The QCRD 
has a staff of thirteen, including a director (Dale Rafal) and six other CPAs. It 
provides staff support to the peer review committees of both the SECPS and 
the PCPS under the overall supervision of Mr. Kelley and in close consultation 
with the chairmen of the two peer review committees.
The section’s administrative cost and that of the QCRD, including staff and 
normal meeting costs, are met from the AICPA’s general budget. The cost of 
the POB and its staff and the cost of special projects are paid from SECPS dues. 
Expenditures for 1982-83 and budgeted expenditures for 1983-84 for the 
Division for CPA Firms, including the operations of the QCRD, and for the 
POB are as shown in the following tabulations:
Budgeted
1983-84
Actual
1982-83
Division for CPA Firms 
Public Oversight Board 
Quality Control Review Division 
Totals
Less quality control revenue 
Net expenditures
(000 omitted) 
$ 695 
900 
908
$ 728 
866 
791
$2,503
110
$2.393
$2,385
100
$2.285
The principal source o f revenue is from administrative charges for reviews 
conducted by committee-appointed review teams.
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MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Membership in the SECPS is voluntary, and the incentives for firms to join and 
participate derive primarily from a firm’s interest in maintaining high-quality 
practice. The membership requirements are designed to improve the quality of 
practice in member firms and to provide the public with information about 
member firms.
REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP
Any CPA firm may join the SECPS. To become a member, a firm must submit 
an application with certain required information and agree to abide by the 
membership requirements. The SECPS has certain membership requirements 
that apply to all members and others that apply only to members with SEC 
clients. Under the general membership requirements, which are similar to those 
of the PCPS, every member firm must agree to do the following:
1. Ensure that a majority of the members of the firm are CPAs, that the 
firm can legally engage in the practice of public accounting, and that 
each partner (or equivalent) resident in the United States and eligible 
for AICPA membership is a member of the AICPA.
2. Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA.
3. Submit to peer reviews, conducted in accordance with review standards 
established by the peer review committee, of the firm’s accounting and 
audit practice at least once every three years and at such additional 
times as may be required by the executive committee.
4. Ensure that each CPA or non-CPA professional in the firm resident in 
the United States participates in at least one hundred and twenty hours 
of continuing professional education every three years and in at least 
twenty hours every year or, alternatively, complies with the mandatory 
CPE requirements for state licensing or for state society membership 
in states in which such requirements average forty hours a reporting 
period.
5. File designated information about the firm for each fiscal year for 
inclusion in its public file.
6. Maintain at least the minimum amounts and types of accountants’ 
liability insurance prescribed by the executive committee.
7. Pay dues, comply with the rules and regulations of the section, cooperate 
with the peer review committee and the special investigations committee, 
and comply with any sanctions imposed.
In addition to the general membership requirements, member firms with 
SEC clients must also agree to do the following:
1. Rotate audit partners on SEC engagements no less frequently than 
every seven years if the firm has five or more SEC clients and ten or 
more partners.
2. Ensure that a second-partner review is made before issuance of an 
audit report on the financial statements of an SEC registrant.
3. Adhere to independence requirements in performing management 
advisory services (MAS) for audit clients whose securities are registered 
with the SEC, abide by certain restrictions on MAS work for SEC clients, 
and file certain information about MAS services for SEC clients for 
inclusion in the firm’s public file.
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4. Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors o f each 
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the client for MAS.
5. Report to the audit committee or board of directors of each SEC audit 
client on the nature of disagreements with the management of the 
client that, if not resolved, would have caused the firm to modify its 
report,
6. Report to the special investigations committee certain litigation, pro­
ceedings, or investigations involving SEC clients.
A firm may resign from the section if at the time of its resignation it is not 
subject to any form of disciplinary proceeding or review. The executive 
committee may, among other things, terminate a firm’s membership for the 
failure to adhere to the requirements of membership.
LEVEL OF MEMBERSHIP
The ability o f the division to attract as members a major portion of AICPA 
members in public practice is a factor in assessing its effectiveness. Table 1 on 
page 48 analyzes and compares division membership with CPA firms represented 
in the AICPA membership as o f April 19, 1983.6 The table shows that 44,063 
AICPA members, or 43 percent o f the 102,539 AICPA members in public 
practice, were associated with the 1,718 member firms. Firms not in the division 
are primarily sole practitioners and firms with less than eleven AICPA members. 
Division membership represents about one-third of firms with six to ten AICPA 
members; just over one-half o f firms with eleven to twenty-five members; and 
84 percent of larger firms, including 100 percent of firms with one hundred or 
more members. Almost all SECPS member firms are also members o f the PCPS.
Table 2 on pages 50—51 contains an analysis of membership in the SECPS 
from March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983. It shows that there were 439 
member firms at December 31, 1983, o f which 240 had no SEC clients. Although 
the number of member firms has declined from the high reached in 1980, the 
number of SEC clients audited by member firms and the number of professionals 
in member firms have increased over the years as follows.
Member SEC
Date Firms Clients Professionals
3/31/79 550 8,621 72,603
3/31/80 574 8,880 72,500
3/31/81 515 8,946 76,813
6/30/82 428 9,618 79,548
6/30/83 426 10,147 83,925
12/31/83 439 10,463 84,671
6. The table is from AICPA, PCPS—Achievements and Prospects, Report of the Special Committee 
to Study the Objectives, Policies, and Procedures of the Private Companies Practice Section (New 
York: AICPA, 1984), p. 12.
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Table 2
SEC Practice Section 
Analysis of Membership 
March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983
Number of Member Firms
Totals
Without
SEC
Clients
With
SEC
Clients
March 31, 1979 550 339 211
1979-1980
Mergers (4) (2) (2)
New members 140 77 63
Resignations (112) (88) (24)
Terminations — — __
Reclassifications — — —
March 31, 1980 574 329 245
1980-81
Mergers 0) (3) (4)
New members 75 47 28
Resignations (109) (75) (34)
Terminations (18) (13) (5)
Reclassifications — 5
March 31, 1981 515 290 225
1981-82
Mergers (6) (1) (5)
New members 30 19 11
Resignations (87) (56) (31)
Terminations (24) (18) (6)
Reclassifications — 1 1 11
June 30, 1982 428 223 205
1982-83 (to 6/30/83)
Mergers (13) (6) (7)
New members 53 41 12
Resignations (41) (28) (13)
Terminations (1) (1) —
Reclassifications —
June 30, 1983 426 229 197
1983 (to 12/31/83)
Mergers (6) (3) (3)
New members 32 24 8
Resignations (13) (6) (7)
Terminations — — —
Reclassifications — ( 4) 4
December 31, 1983 439 240 199
Note: Data for the period from March 31, 1979 to June 30, 1983 are taken from the annual repo rts 
of the POB. Data for the six months ended December 31, 1983, are taken from the SECPS’s 
records. New members and resignations include PCPS members who changed to the SECPS and 
SECPS members who changed to the PCPS.
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Total Changes
March 31, 1979 to December 31, 1983
Number of Member Firms
Without With 
SEC SEC 
Totals Clients Clients
March 31, 1979 550 339 211
Mergers (36) (15) (21)
New Members 330 208 122
Resignations (362) (253) (109)
Terminations (43) (32) (11)
Reclassifications —  ( 7) 7
December 31, 1983 439 240 199
One-third of the decline of 111 firms in the total membership of the section 
is the result of mergers among member firms. Membership of firms with one 
or more SEC clients has declined by only twelve firms and, if the twenty-one 
mergers o f such firms during this period are considered, has increased by nine 
firms.
Some firms that audit SEC clients have chosen to join only the PCPS. The 
following is an analysis o f division membership as of June 30, 1983 by number 
of SEC clients.
Classification SECPS PCPS Only Total
5 or more SEC Clients 43 3 46
Less than 5 154 116 270
None 229 U 4 0 1,369
Totals 426 1,259 1,685
The POB’s 1982—83 annual report shows that a very substantial proportion 
of publicly traded companies, including all of the larger ones, are audited by 
firms that are members of the division. The following is an analysis of the data 
compiled by the POB from Who Audits America.7
SEC Registrants Percent
Audited by Number
197 SECPS firms 7,224
119 PCPS firms 148
316 Division members 7,372
Sales
(Billions)
$3,660
____ 2
$3,662
Number
85%
2%
87%
Sales
99%
99%
7. Data Financial Press, Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, California: Data Financial 
Press, 1982).
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The analysis shows that 197 SECPS member firms audit the financial statements 
of 85 percent of those publicly traded companies and that the combined sales 
volume of those companies accounted for 99 percent of the total for all such 
companies. Although 1,142 publicly traded companies are audited by firms that 
are not members o f the division, those companies, taken as a whole, are relatively 
insignificant in relation to the companies audited by division members. The 
POB also reports that members of the division audit all but three of the U.S. 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and all but twenty-four of 
those listed on the American Stock Exchange.
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The activities of the SECPS are governed by its executive committee, a senior 
committee within the AICPA with the authority to conduct the activities of the 
section to the extent that those activities do not conflict with the policies and 
standards o f the Institute.
COMPOSITION AND SELECTION
The SECPS Executive Committee is composed of representatives from twenty- 
one member firms. Members of the committee are appointed for three-year 
terms by the chairman of the Institute with the approval of the Institute’s Board 
of Directors and with the approval of the existing executive committee. The 
members of the executive committee are selected by a nominating committee, 
consisting of seven persons drawn from seven SECPS member firms and elected 
by the AICPA Council. The section’s organizational document requires that the 
executive committee at all times include a representative from each member 
firm that audits the financial statements of thirty or more SEC registrants 
(currently fourteen firms) and at least five representatives (currently seven) 
from firms that audit the financial statements of fewer than thirty SEC registrants. 
The number of seats that are not permanent can never be less than five because 
the organizational document requires that the size of the committee be increased 
by one for each permanent seat in excess of sixteen.
The chairman of the executive committee is elected by the committee from 
among its members and serves at the pleasure of the executive committee but 
may not serve for more than three one-year terms.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The executive committee establishes general policies for the section and oversees 
its activities. The committee’s responsibilities and functions include determining 
membership requirements, establishing the section’s budget and the dues 
necessary to finance its activities, dealing with complaints against members, 
imposing sanctions on members, appointing committees and task forces, inter­
acting with other AICPA boards and committees, and consulting with the POB.
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS
The executive committee has the authority to impose sanctions on member 
firms either on its own initiative or on the basis of recommendations of the peer 
review committee or the special investigations committee. Under the organiza­
tional document of the section, the types of sanctions that may be imposed on 
member firms for failure to maintain compliance with the requirements for 
membership include these seven.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 . 
7.
Designation of corrective measures to be taken by a firm, including 
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions concerning individual 
firm personnel.
Additional requirements for continuing professional education. 
Accelerated or special peer reviews.
Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
Monetary fines.
Suspension from membership.
Expulsion from membership.
In November 1979, when the special investigations committee was formed, 
the executive committee established rules of procedure for the imposition of 
sanctions. The rules are designed to assure due process to member firms in 
proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions. The executive committee, 
thus far, has imposed no formal sanctions and has received no recommendations 
from the peer review committee or the special investigations committee to do 
so. However, actions taken voluntarily by member firms can, in some instances, 
have the effect of sanctions. Those are the actions taken pursuant to decisions 
of the peer review committee or the special investigations committee in the peer 
review program and the investigative process, or in response to requests by the 
executive committee to comply with membership requirements. Information on 
those types o f actions is usually included in a member firm’s public file but is 
not otherwise publicized.
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
The executive committee generally meets quarterly, usually for one day, but 
may hold special meetings when needed. The chairmen of the peer review 
committee and of the special investigations committee attend executive committee 
meetings periodically and report on their activities. The staff o f the POB attends 
all meetings of the executive committee and the meetings of all other SECPS 
committees and task forces. FOB members also often attend those meetings to 
observe the process and to discuss matters of current concern to the FOB.
The executive committee has a planning committee to assist the chairman in 
carrying out his responsibilities. The planning committee consists of the chairman 
and five members of the committee appointed by the chairman. It usually meets 
at least quarterly about three weeks before an executive committee meeting and 
at other times as needed. The planning committee discusses matters of current 
concern and may act for the executive committee when it is not feasible or 
necessary to convene the full committee to consider a particular matter.
The executive committee also may appoint task forces or subcommittees to 
address specific issues. For example, the executive committee established a task 
force in 1979 to conduct a study of aspects of the auditor’s work environment. 
That task force prepared a position paper addressing those matters, which was 
distributed to the members of the section. Another task force established in 
1981 studied the continuing appropriateness of the section’s membership 
requirements and recommended changes, many of which the executive com­
mittee adopted. On occasion, the executive committee has also established joint 
task forces with the PCPS executive committee to deal with matters of common 
interest to the two sections, such as the publication of the membership directory 
for the division.
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PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
Peer review is the centerpiece of the section’s program of self-regulation. 
Member firms are required to undergo reviews conducted by other practitioners 
(peer reviews) at least every three years. The program is designed to determine 
whether member firms are complying with quality control standards in their 
accounting and audit practices and with the other membership requirements. 
The SECPS Peer Review Committee with the support of the staff of the AICPA 
Quality Control Review Division (QCRD) is responsible for administering the 
program.
PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE
The SECPS Peer Review Committee is a permanent standing committee with 
fifteen members. The members, including the chairman, are appointed from 
member firms by the executive committee. The peer review committee is 
responsible for administering the peer review program and establishing stand­
ards for peer reviews. Its responsibilities also include making recommendations 
to the executive committee on sanctions and other disciplinary decisions, 
consulting with the POB, and maintaining records of peer reviews conducted. 
A similarly structured committee, the PCPS Peer Review Committee, performs 
the same functions for members of the PCPS with the support of the QCRD.
STANDARDS FOR PEER REVIEWS
The standards for conducting and reporting on peer reviews, first published in 
1978—79 and periodically updated, are contained in each section’s peer review 
manual. In conjunction with those manuals, each section publishes a loose-leaf 
binder, which includes all required peer review forms, checklists and instructions, 
and recent amendments and interpretations of the standards and administrative 
procedures. Amendments and interpretations of standards require the written 
approval of two-thirds of the members of the peer review committee.
TYPES OF PEER REVIEWS
Members of either section of the Division for CPA Firms may elect to undergo 
peer reviews of the following types:
1. Committee-appointed review team (CART) review, a review conducted by a 
team appointed by the respective peer review committee.
2. Firm-on-firm review, a review conducted by another member firm.
3. Association-sponsored review, a review administered under an authorized 
program of an association of CPA firms.
4. State society-sponsored review, a review administered under an authorized 
program of a state society of CPAs.
SECPS and PCPS peer reviews are structured essentially the same for all types 
of reviews. They are administered by the same staff, the QCRD, under standards 
that are substantively the same, frequently using the same peer reviewers. The 
peer review committees o f the two sections operate in substantially the same 
manner and cooperate in developing standards and procedures for peer reviews. 
However, SECPS peer reviews are conducted under POB oversight and are 
closely monitored by the POB and its staff.
The SECPS peer review program originally required the use of quality control 
review panels, a select panel of professionals appointed by the peer review
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committee to evaluate the work of peer reviewers, for firm-on-firm reviews and 
for reviews administered by associations of CPA firms or under an authorized 
program of a state society o f CPAs. The SECPS eliminated the use o f such 
panels in 1982, based on a recommendation of the POB.
The quality control systems of member firms usually differ based on their 
size and type of practice. Accordingly, a peer review is tailored to the size and 
type of practice of a particular firm. Both sections have published peer review 
guidelines for—
•  Sole practitioners without full-time professional staff.
•  Firms with generally two to twenty professionals.
•  Firms with generally twenty to fifty professionals.
•  Firms with generally over fifty professionals.
REPORTS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS
Peer reviewers are required to issue a report on each peer review conducted 
and, if applicable, a letter of comment on matters that may require action by 
the firm. The report may be unqualified, qualified, or adverse. Letters of 
comment have been issued as a result of most peer reviews to identify matters 
relating to a firm’s quality controls that require the firm’s attention. The reviewed 
firm is required to prepare a written response to a letter of comment describing 
the actions it has taken or plans to take.
On each peer review, the peer review committee considers the report, the 
letter of comment, if any, and the firm’s response to the letter o f comment. 
Based on the nature and extent of the review team’s findings, the peer review 
committee may decide to accept the report and the related documents only if 
the firm agrees to meet certain conditions. Such conditions may include 
accelerated or special peer reviews, revisit by a peer reviewer, additional CPF 
requirements, or other steps to provide reasonable assurance that the firm has 
remedied the deficiencies noted. The committee does this, instead of recom­
mending the imposition o f sanctions, because it believes that placing emphasis 
on corrective measures for identified deficiencies is ordinarily the best way to 
achieve the section’s objectives o f improving the quality o f practice and main­
taining an effective system of self-regulation.
The public file of an SECPS member firm that has undergone a peer review 
includes, among other things, the peer review report, the letter of comment, if 
any, the firm’s response, the letter to the firm communicating acceptance and 
indicating corrective actions required, if any, and other documents pertaining 
to corrective action.
POB MONITORING OF THE PROGRAM
The POB monitors and evaluates both the program as a whole and individual 
peer reviews. Its work involves observing reviews in process on all firms with 
five or more SEC clients and other reviews on a selected basis and attending 
meetings o f the SECPS Peer Review Committee and of its subcommittees and 
task forces. The POB’s comments, suggestions, or reservations about the program 
as a whole or about individual peer reviews are discussed with the committee.
The QCRD communicates frequently with the POB’s staff. It provides 
information on scheduling arrangements and changes in such arrangements, 
sends copies of the peer review reports and related documents to the POB
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when a peer review is completed, and responds to inquiries by the POB’s staff 
concerning peer review reports or working papers.
The POB evaluates the effectiveness of the peer review program in its annual 
reports.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM
In carrying out its responsibility to maintain an effective system of self-regulation 
through the peer review program, the peer review committee meets approxi­
mately five times a year. The QCRD provides all necessary staff support, takes 
care o f the day-to-day administration of the program, and reports all significant 
unusual matters to the committee. The peer review committee evaluates peer 
review reports, monitors the corrective actions taken by firms, takes initiatives 
to make sure that the program as a whole remains effective, and maintains 
overall supervision of staff activities. The bulk of the administrative work consists 
of maintaining a data bank of qualified peer reviewers, scheduling reviews, 
consulting with reviewers and reviewed firms, and monitoring the progress of 
reviews through completion and acceptance by the committee.
Data bank of peer reviewers. Annually, the QCRD asks member firms to 
nominate accounting and audit partners and managers for service on review 
teams. Persons nominated are required to submit profiles indicating, among 
other things, the extent and areas of their experience, their past participation 
in peer reviews, and their availability. The information on prospective reviewers 
is included in a reviewer data bank, from which reviewers for CART reviews 
are selected.
Scheduling reviews. Each year, the QCRD asks firms required to undergo peer 
reviews during the year to submit general background and scheduling infor­
mation. If a firm elects to have a CART review, the QCRD, using the information 
supplied by the firm, selects a review team and a team captain by searching the 
reviewer data bank. When the peer review team has been accepted by the firm 
undergoing review, an engagement letter is drafted. The engagement letter sets 
forth, among other things, the scheduled timing of the review, the names and 
firms of the reviewers, the hours budgeted for the review, and the reviewers’ 
rates. Also, the QCRD staff mails to the team captain the forms, checklists, and 
instructions needed to assist in the review.
For other forms of reviews, the QCRD reviews the arrangements with the 
firms to determine whether the reviewers meet the qualifications for conducting 
peer reviews. In some instances, based on criteria established by the peer review 
committee, a committee member may conduct an on-site review of the reviewers’ 
work.
The QCRD maintains files on scheduling information relating to all types of 
reviews and monitors the scheduling to make sure that all member firms undergo 
timely reviews.
Consulting with reviewers and reviewed firms. The QCRD staff helps resolve 
numerous questions that arise in connection with scheduling and conducting 
reviews. In addition, reviewers are required to consult with the QCRD staff in 
specified circumstances, for example, when a modified report is being considered 
or when no letter of comment is expected to be issued. The staff documents 
responses to major questions and maintains a subject file on responses to assure 
consistency in the advice given.
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Monitoring performance and completion. The QCRD staff regularly monitors 
the work of peer reviewers to assure that the reviewers complete their work 
and submit the required materials on time. A policy adopted by both sections 
in 1982 requires the QCRD to report regularly to the peer review committee 
chairman on all instances in which reviewers or reviewed firms do not complete 
their work on time. Based on discussions with the appropriate parties, the 
QCRD staff attempts to determine the reason for the delay and to estimate the 
completion date. The full peer review committee is informed of missed deadlines 
at its regular meetings and evaluates whether to refer the matter to the 
professional ethics division (if the problem is attributable to the reviewer) or to 
hold hearings to determine whether to recommend sanctions against reviewed 
firms.
When a review has been completed, the QCRD staff reviews the peer review 
report, the letter of comment, and the firm’s response. The QCRD staff also 
reviews the working papers on a CART review and at least the summary review 
memorandum on all other reviews. Staff reviews, which are made following 
guidelines approved by the peer review committee, and the staff s findings are 
reported to the peer review evaluation subcommittee for its consideration.
Consideration of reports. Copies of every peer review report, letter of comment, 
firm response, and related matters are sent to the peer review committee’s 
evaluation subcommittee. Based on reviews of those documents and consider­
ation of the staff's findings, the subcommittee decides whether to recommend 
to the full committee acceptance of the reports or whether any further action 
is necessary by the reviewed firms, the reviewers, or the committee. The 
subcommittee discusses its recommendations with the full committee, which 
ratifies or revises them. The QCRD staff notifies the firm of the acceptance of 
the report and of any conditions specified by the committee. At each subsequent 
committee meeting, the staff reports on the status of those actions until the 
matter is resolved.
Records of peer reviews. The QCRD maintains records on peer reviews 
conducted. The files contain documentation of scheduling, administrative, 
review, and acceptance procedures. In addition, computerized records are kept 
on all member firms, including admission date, date of the last peer review, 
and the due date of the next peer review. Current statistics are maintained on 
the number of member firms by review year and the total number and type of 
peer review reports accepted by the peer review committee. To assist the 
committee in evaluating the possible implications for the peer review process, 
an analysis of modified reports accepted by the committee is also maintained.
Consultations. Questions regarding peer reviews are directed to the QCRD by 
member firms and by peer reviewers. The QCRD staff is responsible for 
answering those questions. As necessary, the staff consults with the AICPA’s 
vice president-technical, the committee chairman, the Technical Information 
Services Division, and the POB and its staff. If the issue involves a potential 
change in peer review standards or practice, the matter is brought to the 
attention of the full committee.
PEER REVIEW RESULTS
Based on the information in the POB’s 1982—83 annual report as updated to 
December 31, 1983, the following is a summary of the types of peer review 
reports issued and the types of actions required by the peer review committee 
over the first five years of the program.
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Type of 
Report
Number
of
Reviews
Actions Required by PRC*
Accelerated
Reviews Revisits Other
No
Action
Unqualified 433 — 6 4 424
Qualified 64 13 17 4 41
Adverse 13 12 10 6 —
510 25 3 14 465
* Note; The total number of actions (72) plus the total number not requiring action (465) 
exceeds the total number of reviews (510) because a number of firms were required to take 
more than one type of action.
The deficiencies identified in the qualified or adverse reports involved designated 
areas of quality control, such as supervision, inspection, consultation, independ­
ence, and advancement. Other areas identified included noncompliance with 
other membership requirements such as concurring partner review, continuing 
professional education, and liability insurance. In all of those instances, firms 
agreed to take the required corrective actions.
The peer review process has also identified substandard performance— 
instances of failures to comply with generally accepted accounting principles 
(the body of technical standards governing the preparation and presentation of 
financial statements) or generally accepted auditing standards (the body of 
technical standards governing the performance of an audit by a CPA)—on 
individual engagements. The POB reports that 61, or 3.2 percent, of the 1,919 
engagements reviewed in 1981 and 1982 were deemed to be substandard. In 
connection with those engagements the firms took the following corrective 
actions.
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised and 
reissued
Omitted auditing procedures performed 
Cause of impairment of independence eliminated 
GAAP or GAAS deficiencies not requiring immediate action 
corrected in subsequent year’s audit 
Total
14
7
3
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RESULTS OF OVERSIGHT
The scope of the POB’s oversight of the peer review program for 1983 is shown 
in the following table.
Type of POB Oversight
Total 
Number 
of Firms
Visitation-
Observa­
tion
Working-Paper Report 
Review Review
30 or more 11 11
10 to 29 6 6
5 to 9 8 8
1 to 4 59 11 29 19
None 60 4 22 34
Totals 144 40
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Number of SEC 
Registrants 
Audited by Firm
The SEC, through an arrangement that gives it limited access to peer review 
working papers, evaluates the effectiveness of the process and of the POB’s 
oversight of the process. The SEC stated in its 1982 report to Congress on its 
oversight of the accounting profession that
Under the terms of an “access” arrangement agreed to by the SECPS and the 
Commission, for the first time the Commission’s staff reviewed a sample of the 
working papers underlying reviews. Based on this review and the staff's review of 
the POB’s oversight files, the Commission has determined that it can rely to a great 
extent on the POB’s oversight function in fulfilling its own responsibilities. Never­
theless, the Commission will continue to monitor the peer review process by reviewing 
certain working papers pursuant to the access arrangement so that it can periodically 
evaluate this important self-regulatory initiative and the need for refinements in the 
process as a result of changing professional, economic, and regulatory conditions.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
The SECPS Special Investigations Committee was established to consider the 
implications of alleged audit failures of member firms relating to a case in 
litigation. The need to establish investigative and disciplinary procedures for 
alleged or possible audit failures was among the earliest matters involving 
consultation between the executive committee and the POB. The decision was 
made that the protection of users of audited financial statements should be the 
dominant consideration. Alleged audit failures may raise questions about the 
adequacy of auditing standards and procedures, the quality controls of the 
member firms, or perhaps the firms’ offices responsible for the audits. The 
POB concurred in the SECPS’s decision to establish a permanent committee to 
monitor and to determine actions that should be taken concerning alleged or 
possible audit failures involving member firms, and the executive committee 
established the special investigations committee in November 1979 to serve that 
purpose.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE
The special investigations committee was established in recognition of the 
significant public interest in matters concerning the practice of public accounting 
that have a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC registrants. 
Its principal concerns relate to the adequacy of generally accepted auditing 
standards and quality control standards and to the compliance by member firms 
with those standards in the conduct of their accounting and audit practices. 
According to its organizational document, these are its primary objectives. •
•  Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the public and to the 
profession that member firms are complying with professional standards 
in the conduct of their practice before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission by identifying corrective measures, if any, that should be 
taken by a member firm involved in a specific alleged audit failure.
•  Assist in improving the quality of practice by member firms before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission by determining whether facts 
relating to specific alleged audit failures indicate that changes in generally 
accepted auditing standards or quality control standards need to be 
considered.
•  Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed necessary, 
appropriate sanctions on the member firms involved.
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The committee considers the implications of cases while litigation is still in 
process. Therefore, its inquiries begin as soon as it becomes aware of an alleged 
audit failure and it usually concludes its work long before litigation comes to 
an end.
COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE
The special investigations committee consists of nine active or retired partners 
of member firms, no more than one from any firm. The members o f the 
committee, including its chairman, are appointed by the executive committee. 
They are appointed for a three-year term and may be reappointed to serve for 
three additional one-year terms. They are not permitted to serve concurrently 
on either the executive committee or the peer review committee. They may not 
participate in deliberations involving their firms; they also are excluded from 
deliberations on matters involving other firms if they have, or believe they have, 
a conflict of interest. For example, a committee member is deemed to have a 
conflict of interest in a matter if the committee member’s firm conducted the 
most recent peer review of the firm under investigation. For the purpose o f the 
conflict of interest rules, retired partners are treated the same as active partners 
for three years following their retirement.
The committee currently consists of five retired partners and four active 
partners. The two chairmen to date have been active partners, although that is 
not required.
MEMBER FIRMS’ REPORTING REQUIREMENT
To enable the committee to carry out its functions, SECPS member firms are 
required to report to the committee certain litigation, proceedings, or investi­
gations involving the firm or its personnel. Reportable actions are generally 
limited to those that allege audit or reporting deficiencies relating to a firm’s 
SEC clients in connection with filings under the federal securities laws. Section 
IV.3(m) of the SECPS’s organizational document requires member firms to
Report to the special investigations committee, within thirty days of service on the 
firm or its personnel of the first pleading in the matter or within thirty days of 
joining the section, if later, any litigation (including criminal indictments) against it 
or its personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly announced by a 
regulatory agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not including 
additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved in litigation origi­
nally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that involves clients or former clients that 
are SEC registrants and that alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or 
reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the federal securities 
laws. With respect to matters previously reported under this subparagraph, member 
firms shall report to the committee additional proceedings, settlements, court 
decisions on substantive issues, and the filing of appeals within thirty days of their 
occurrence.
The requirement is amplified by a footnote that requires reporting of all cases 
involving an allegation that a member firm or its personnel violated federal 
securities laws. The footnote states:
An allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding, or investigation that a member 
firm or its personnel have violated the federal securities laws in connection with 
services other than an audit for an SEC registrant shall be reported.
The staff o f the committee monitors SEC releases and various business and 
financial publications to assure that firms comply with the reporting requirement.
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The staff also brings to the attention of the committee publicized litigation that 
does not involve SEC registrants. From time to time, when it deems it necessary 
to do so in the public interest, the special investigations committee requests 
firms to voluntarily report matters that are outside the scope of the reporting 
requirement. All such requests have been complied with.
OPERATIONS
The special investigations committee operates under procedures and guidelines 
approved by the executive committee. (The discussion of the structure and 
authority of the special investigations committee in the body of this report 
[pages 30-32] contains additional information on its modes of operation.) The 
committee’s organizational document provides that its activities involve four 
modes: screening, monitoring, investigation of a firm, and investigation of a 
case. Activities and decisions in the four modes consist of the activities and 
possible decisions shown in the figure below.
Activities
Screening—A procedure initiated when 
a case is reported and generally com­
pleted within ninety days in which 
the nature and implications of alle­
gations, findings of the latest peer 
review, and other relevant informa­
tion is reviewed to determine what 
further action should be taken, if any.
Monitoring—A procedure for holding 
open a case not resolved in the screen­
ing phase pending receipt of infor­
mation, such as future financial state­
ments, the results of a peer review, 
or a report by a bankruptcy trustee.
Investigation of a Firm—A procedure 
involving a special review by a com­
mittee-appointed task force or the 
firm’s peer reviewers, of specific of­
fices, functions, industry practice seg­
ments, people, policies, or procedures 
to evaluate whether the firm needs to 
take corrective actions.
Investigation of a Case—A procedure 
involving an examination of the al­
legations in a specific case by refer­
ence to the working papers or other 
direct evidence. This may be under­
taken only after obtaining the ap­
proval of the executive committee.
Possible Decisions
Close the case.
Monitor developments. 
Investigate the firm.
Follow up to assure that appro­
priate corrective actions have been 
taken.
Close the case.
Investigate the firm.
Follow up to assure that appro­
priate corrective actions have been 
taken.
Close the case.
Follow up to assure that appro­
priate corrective actions have been 
taken.
Recommend sanctions when ap­
propriate corrective actions have 
not been taken.
Such an investigation has not been 
considered to be feasible for the 
reasons stated elsewhere in this 
report.
When a matter is reported to the special investigations committee, it begins 
its consideration by screening the available information. Screening procedures 
usually include the following:
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•  All committee members receive and review copies of the original 
complaint, any consolidated amended complaints, and a case summary 
prepared by the staff.
•  The chairman assigns one or two members to handle the matter.
•  Assigned committee members receive and review copies of relevant 
financial statements and SEC filings and other documents within the 
public domain, such as bankruptcy trustee reports.
•  The assigned committee members review the firm’s most recent peer 
review report, the peer review letter of comment, and the firm’s response 
to the letter of comment.
If the committee is unable to dispose of the case based on those steps, the 
assigned members may—
•  Discuss the matter with representatives of the firm and, if appropriate, 
with the firm’s peer reviewer.
•  Review the working papers on the firm’s last peer review.
•  Review other information submitted by the firm, such as internal 
inspection results.
At any point during the screening procedure, the committee may close its 
files on a case, either because the case appears to lack merit or because no 
corrective actions are necessary or have already been taken by the firm. If the 
committee is not prepared to close the case on the basis of its screening 
procedures but not convinced that an investigation of the firm or of the case is 
needed, it will usually hold the case open to monitor further developments.
At any point during screening or monitoring, the committee may decide that 
an investigation of the firm is required. An investigation of the firm is, generally 
speaking, a special peer review that is focused on a specific area o f practice, a 
particular office or offices, designated personnel, or specified quality control 
policies and procedures. Such investigations have been conducted by firms’ peer 
reviewers and by a special task force o f the committee. However performed, a 
special peer review is conducted under the personal direction of the assigned 
committee members. Before an investigation of a firm is authorized, the firm 
has the right to present its arguments on why an investigation may be unnecessary 
at a meeting of the full committee.
The investigation of the auditor’s working papers and other relevant evidence 
in a specific case while litigation is in process has not been considered to be 
feasible for reasons stated on pages 30—32 of this report. There is little need 
for such investigation after the conclusion of litigation, since corrective actions, 
if required, should already have been taken. In discussing the practical limitations 
affecting the investigation o f specific cases, the POB’s 1982-83 annual report 
stated that
Certain practical limitations affect the committee’s ability to conduct an investigation 
of a specific alleged failure. In fact, the capacity of the committee to conduct an 
investigation is far more limited than that of private litigants or the SEC. For 
example, it cannot take testimony of witnesses under oath and it cannot subpoena 
documents or witnesses. It must rely on the willingness of the audit firm to supply 
evidence. Hence, were it to pass judgment on a firm or an individual in connection 
with an alleged audit failure, it would not have as firm a basis for that judgment as 
would the SEC or a court. The danger of an unfair result would be significant. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that private litigants might then use this 
conclusion, founded on an insufficient record, as evidence in civil litigation.
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Since the primary objective of the special investigative process is preventive and not 
punitive, the committee can accomplish its objective effectively by conducting an 
investigation of the firm’s quality control system without the risks inherent in an 
investigation of the specific alleged audit failure.
The Board believes that the special investigative process has no need to duplicate 
the work of the SEC or the civil courts. Rather, the committee’s responsibility is (1) 
to determine whether charges in litigation or other proceedings involving audit 
performance indicate that there are insufficiencies in auditing standards or the 
quality controls of the auditing firm that require remedial action and (2) to ascertain 
that such remedial action is taken so that whatever gave rise to the charges should 
not again be the source of problems.
The rules of the special investigations committee require that it conduct its 
affairs in privacy on a strictly confidential basis. Privacy and confidentiality are 
deemed essential to allow the committee to operate effectively and to avoid 
prejudicing a member firm while litigation is in process. However, the executive 
committee may authorize public disclosure of information on any investigation 
or sanction. The POB has access to the files and proceedings of the committee 
on a confidential basis and is authorized, after hearing the views of a firm and 
after consultation with the executive committee, to make public disclosure of 
information it deems necessary in the interest of the profession and the public.
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Since the inception of the committee in 1979 through December 31, 1983, the 
committee placed eighty-two cases on its agenda. Of those cases, seventy-five 
were reported by firms pursuant to the membership requirement to report 
specific matters and seven were voluntarily reported after the committee received 
information from other sources and asked the firms to do so. The status of 
those cases at December 31, 1983, was as follows:
Cases closed:
After screening or monitoring 
After investigation of the firm
Cases open:
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Being screened 12
Being monitored 3
Investigation of firm in process 2
17
Total 82
THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
The POB is an important structural feature of the program of self-regulation— 
an independent, institutional representation of the public interest.
ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION, AND STRUCTURE
The SECPS’s organizational document requires a public oversight board con­
sisting of five members “drawn from among prominent individuals of high 
integrity and reputation, including, but not limited to, former public officials, 
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators, economists, and
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business executives.” The POB was formed early in 1978 and held its first 
meeting in March, 1978. The initial members of the POB, appointed by the 
executive committee with the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, were:
John J. McCloy, Chairman 
Ray Garrett, Jr., Vice Chairman 
William L. Cary
John D. Harper 
Arthur M. Wood
Mr. McCloy, who served with distinction as chairman from the board’s 
inception until 1984, served as the assistant secretary o f war from 1941 to 1945, 
the United States military governor and high commissioner for Germany from 
1949 to 1952, the chairman of the board of directors of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank from 1955 to 1960 and is a member of the New York City law firm of 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy. He was reelected chairman for a three- 
year term ending in December, 1986 but resigned early in 1984 for personal 
reasons. Mr. Garrett, who served as vice chairman until his death in February 
1980, was the chairman of the SEC from 1973 to 1975 and thereafter a member 
of the Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton 8c Douglas. Mr. Cary, who resigned 
from the board in 1982 for reasons of ill health, was the chairman of the SEC 
from 1961 to 1964 and the Dwight Professor of Law at Columbia University 
until his death in 1982. Mr. Harper, whose present term ends in 1985, is the 
former chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer of 
Aluminum Company of America. Mr. Wood, whose present term ends in 1985 
and who was appointed vice chairman in 1982 and chairman in 1984, is the 
former chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer of Sears, 
Roebuck and Co.
To fill the vacancy created by the death of Ray Garrett, Jr., Robert K. Mautz 
was appointed in 1981. Mr. Mautz, who has spent most of his career as an 
educator and as a researcher, has been the director since 1978 of the Paton 
Accounting Center at the University o f Michigan and is a former member of 
the federal government’s Cost Accounting Standards Board. To fill the vacancy 
created by the resignation of William L. Cary, A. A. Sommer, Jr. was appointed 
to the board in 1983. Mr. Sommer is a former SEC commissioner and is a 
member of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis 8c Bockius.
The board has a full-time staff of six people, consisting o f four CPAs, an 
administrative assistant, and a secretary. Louis W. Matusiak, a former partner 
in the CPA firm of Alexander Grant & Company, has served as executive 
director since 1978 and as executive director and secretary since 1982. Richard 
A. Stark, a member o f the New York City law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
8c McCloy, who initially served as secretary to the board and as an assistant to 
Mr. McCloy, now serves as legal counsel to the board. The board also engages 
recently retired partners of CPA firms to assist the permanent staff when 
required.
Following its formation, the POB recommended, and the AICPA adopted, a 
change in the SECPS’s organizational document to provide a higher degree of 
independence from the section and from the Institute. The change provides 
that following its initial appointment, the POB has the authority to appoint, 
remove, and set the terms and compensation of its members and select its 
chairman, with the limitation that its members are appointed in consultation 
with and subject to approval o f the AICPA Board of Directors. The POB’s 
bylaws established staggered three-year terms for its members, with a provision 
that a member may be appointed for successive terms without limit. The bylaws 
also established the procedures for the conduct of meetings and the operations 
of the POB.
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The POB was established as an oversight body without line authority over 
the section. In an early decision of the board, it concurred that it should not 
have such authority. The board believes that its oversight function is best 
exercised without the authority to compel compliance with its views or to 
overrule the executive committee on decisions contrary to its views. The board 
believes that its ability to offer objective comments and criticisms is enhanced 
by not being a formal part of the structure for planning and executing policy 
decisions o f the SECPS. The board’s opinion is that its ability to comment 
publicly on matters regarding the accounting profession provides sufficient 
power to discharge its oversight responsibilities.
All expenses o f the POB and its staff are paid from SECPS membership dues. 
The board has fixed the annual remuneration of its members at $50,000 for 
the chairman, $40,000 for the vice chairman, and $30,000 for other members. 
The following tabulation shows the annual expenses of the board reported since 
its inception.
Year
Ending
July 31, 1979 
July 31, 1980 
June 30, 1981 
June 30, 1982 
July 31, 1983
Amount
$617,617
589,824
691,300
758,400
865,600
RESPONSIBILITIES
The POB has broad oversight responsibilities. As stated in the SECPS’s orga­
nizational document, the POB’s responsibilities and functions are the following.
•  Monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the peer 
review and executive committees to assure their effectiveness.
•  Determine that the peer review committee is ascertaining that firms are 
taking appropriate action as a result of peer reviews.
•  Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities of the section.
•  Make recommendations to the executive committee for improvements 
in the operation of the section.
•  Publish an annual report and such other reports as may be deemed 
necessary with respect to its activities.
•  Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions.
•  Have the right for any or all o f its members to attend any meetings o f  
the executive committee.
MONITORING THE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
A major responsibility of the POB is to monitor and evaluate the activities of 
the peer review committee, the peer reviews of member firms, and the actions 
taken by the SECPS as a result o f peer reviews. The board uses its permanent 
and part-time staff in the monitoring activity. Board representatives are required 
to assess the appropriateness of the conduct of the reviews and the reports 
issued and to challenge any that may not conform with peer review standards.
The procedures used in monitoring reviews include a visitation-observation 
program, a working-paper review program, and a report review program. 
Visitation-observation consists of an examination of working papers and reports
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prepared by reviewers and of visits to one or more offices of the reviewed firm 
during the performance of the review. Visitations are made primarily by staff 
members with selected attendance by board members. Working paper reviews 
consist o f examinations o f working papers, reports and letters of comment 
prepared by the reviewers, and the responses of the reviewed firms. Report 
reviews are generally limited to a reading of the reviewer’s summary memoran­
dum, the peer review report, the letter of comment, if any, and the firm’s 
response.
The POB requires some form of monitoring by its staff of all peer reviews 
o f SECPS member firms. The visitation-observation program is used on reviews 
of all firms with five or more SEC clients and, on a random sample basis, a 
number of other reviews o f firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a 
representative number of reviews of firms with no SEC clients. The visitation- 
observation program or working-paper review program is used for subsequent 
reviews o f firms that receive modified reports indicating a deficiency in their 
quality control systems. The number of peer reviews monitored in 1982 and 
the types o f monitoring are shown under the discussion of the peer review 
program.
MONITORING THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
The FOB was consulted and approved the formation of the special investigations 
committee. The FOB monitors the activities of that committee in depth. The 
Po b ’s staff attends all meetings of the special investigations committee. Board 
members attend some of those meetings. The FOB and its staff have complete 
access to all committee files and actively monitor the committee’s decisions on 
individual cases. The FOB’s staff reads the pertinent court documents, financial 
information, and correspondence related to reported cases, and attends, at its 
discretion, meetings between firm representatives and committee members. The 
staff also reviews the committee’s working papers on all investigations. As 
indicated in the discussion of the special investigations committee, the board 
reports on the results o f its monitoring activities in its annual reports.
MEETINGS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
The FOB normally meets monthly and may hold other meetings as necessary. 
At each meeting the board receives reports from its staff on the activities of the 
components o f the SECPS. The board conducted public hearings in connection 
with its study on the scope o f services, and members of the board have testified 
before Congressional committees, published articles on the SECPS, and made 
public speeches. Board members and staff meet as needed with the commissioners 
and staff o f the SEC.
REPORTING
The FOB issues an annual report, which reviews in depth the activities of the 
SECPS. Five reports have been issued since the inception of the board. The 
1982—83 report contains a comprehensive review of the activities of the SECPS 
during its first five years. The reports are widely distributed and serve as the 
basis o f much o f the information on the SECPS that is now available to the 
financial community.
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appendix B
SELF-REGULATION: 
PERILS AND PROBLEMS
by ROBERT K. MAUTZ
Initially presented as Mr. Mautz’s views in a talk prepared for the American Institute of 
CPAs tenth national conference on current SEC developments, this adaptation (reprinted 
from the Journal of Accountancy, May 1983) has since been reviewed by the public 
oversight board (POB) of the SEC practice section of the AICPA division for CPA firms 
and generally expresses the board’s sentiments. The POB oversees the self-regulatory efforts 
of the SEC practice section. The conference was held in Washington, D.C., January 11 
and 12, 1983.
Embarking on a program of self-regulation is anything but risk-free. An 
important and perhaps unrecognized risk is the danger that expectations about 
the program may not be met and that this could encourage unwise actions. 
Unfulfilled expectations may result from inadequate performance of the self- 
regulatory process or from unrealistic expectations. The profession’s experience, 
to date, suggests that unrealistic expectations may be the greater danger.
Unrealistic expectations arise because critics of the self-regulatory process— 
and even some participants—fail to recognize that—
•  Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in scope, operating within the 
constraints imposed by an already existing and rigorous disciplinary 
system.
•  Any regulatory activity, and self-regulation in particular, requires a 
difficult balancing of private rights and public good.
•  Self-regulation differs from public regulation in motivation, method 
and purpose.
Robert K. Mautz, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public oversight board of the SEC practice 
section of the American Institute of CPAs Division for CPA Firms and is director of the Paton 
Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. A member of the Accounting 
Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz is a past president of the American Accounting Association and a 
former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has served on the AICPA Council and Board 
of Directors. In 1980 he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute’s highest honor.
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THE SCOPE OF REGULATION
If one considers regulation in the broadest sense, the complexity of the total 
process is overwhelming. It includes, on the one hand, such considerations as 
the maintenance o f an economic and legal environment conducive to the 
continued provision of professional services for those who desire them and, on 
the other hand, sufficient control o f conditions so that competition in the 
provision of those services does not fail and a monopoly does not emerge to 
exploit society’s needs. It involves acceptance of the fact that the contracting 
for and the performance o f services will from time to time result in misunder­
standings or disagreements about the cost or quality of the services performed. 
When this occurs, a system for adjudicating such disputes is needed, a system 
that is recognized as both authoritative and equitable to all parties.
When members o f the public are unable to evaluate the quality of a service 
because o f its technical nature, a licensing provision requiring practitioners to 
meet established qualifications, perhaps including examination, may be appro­
priate. In addition, standards o f performance must be established together with 
some means o f reviewing that performance to protect the lay public from 
substandard practice. Finally, on those relatively rare occasions when perform­
ance deviates so far from the norm that sanctions are in order, the authority to 
impose and enforce sanctions becomes a part of the regulatory process.
Given a fresh start and no limitations, one might invent a program of self­
regulation that includes all the activities described. To do so might be interesting, 
but it would not be a very useful activity. Society has indicated no desire to free 
accounting, or any other profession, from all of the regulatory mechanisms now 
in place. Agencies with far greater powers than any possessed by the accounting 
profession police competition in the economy. An existing system of courts 
settles civil disputes. Licensing powers are reserved for the states. A multiplicity 
of federal and local policing organizations are constantly on the alert for criminal 
activity. The Securities and Exchange Commission has been assigned regulatory 
responsibilities that it shows no sign of relinquishing, and it couldn’t relinquish 
these responsibilities even if it would.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but one element in a complex system 
of controls. Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession a limited set of 
privileges, among them the right and responsibility to develop, establish, review 
and refine standards o f professional performance. Society does so at least partly 
because it believes the technical expertise and situational understanding of 
members o f the profession qualify them to perform that role effectively. There 
is no reason, nor has accounting the ability, to challenge the other participants 
in the total regulatory structure. If accountants perform their role satisfactorily, 
the tasks o f the others will all be eased. Accountants have a small niche in the 
total regulatory process—but an important one.
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
Establishing and maintaining appropriate standards of professional performance 
demand a proper balance o f private rights and public responsibility. In a 
perceptive article entitled “The Professions Under Siege” Jacques Barzun takes 
note o f the diminishing status of the professions, including accounting, the 
unavoidable conflict o f interest between members of a profession and the lay
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public that uses its services, the vulnerability of the professions to public 
displeasure and the real dangers of public regulation.1
Professionals ask for special privileges, including the exclusion from practice 
of those who don’t qualify. In return for privileges, society demands superior 
performance, high ethical behavior and very rare failures. Absent society’s 
satisfaction, the profession’s privileges are endangered.
Balancing private rights and public responsibilities is a difficult matter indeed, 
one Barzun contends is well beyond the scope of codes and policing. In his 
view, what is needed is a moral regeneration “which can come about only when 
the members of a group feel once more confident that ethical behavior is 
desirable, widely practiced, approved, and admired.’’2 To establish and maintain 
such a condition should be part of the goal of self-regulation.
But how are such high-sounding goals to be achieved in the practical, down- 
to-earth, highly competitive world o f accounting? Accomplishment is neither 
easy nor impossible, but the problems involved are gaining increasing attention 
in the profession where the spotlight has been focused on the American Institute 
of CPAs division for CPA firms, which includes the SEC practice section (SECPS) 
and the section’s public oversight board (POB).
PUBLIC REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION
However similar their goals, public regulation and self-regulation have important 
differences, not all of which are immediately apparent. Public regulation is 
conducted with the full power of the state in support of established requirements. 
Self-regulation has no equivalent authority. At most, it can exclude noncomplying 
members from whatever benefits group membership confers or impose whatever 
sanctions members have voluntarily agreed to accept. Such powers as the ability 
to subpoena records and witnesses are not available in self-regulation.
Public regulation is likely to emphasize punishment for transgressions; self­
regulation will more likely emphasize remedies and the avoidance o f future 
deficiencies. There are reasons for this. Public regulation is commonly employed 
only when the community has become aroused by what it considers improper 
conduct. The public wants that conduct stopped and finds punishment a useful 
deterrent. Self-regulation, however, often has a strong concern for equity to 
members o f the group, which must somehow be balanced with service to the 
community. Members o f the group and the community are both served more 
effectively by remedy than by punishment.
Self-regulatory processes accept the need for punishment in egregious cases, 
but sanctions are likely to have a positive purpose—to be aimed at improved 
service to society along with equitable treatment of the regulated. Public 
regulation tends to view infractions as willful violations deserving punishment. 
Self-regulation is concerned with establishing standards for proper conduct and 
eliminating the causes of unintentional and perhaps unrecognized failings as 
well as the rate refusal to meet professional standards.
Finally, public regulation offers opportunities not available to those engaged 
in self-regulation. Many a successful political career has been founded on the
1. Jacques Barzun, “The Professions Under Siege,” Harper’s (October 1978), pp. 61-68.
2. Ibid., p. 68.
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publicity and acclaim accorded a vigorous and resourceful prosecutor. Protecting 
the public, putting the rascals away and battling the wrongdoers earns recog­
nition, gratitude and higher public office. There is no equivalent opportunity 
or reward in self-regulation.
Self-regulation, if it is justified at all, must rest on something more than the 
self-interest o f those regulated. Generally, self-regulation is perceived as more 
equitable than public regulation because the standards to be met are established 
and enforced by fellow practitioners whose experience provides an understand­
ing o f the environment, the risks, the pressures and the possibilities of service 
that laymen neither comprehend nor understand. Self-regulation, if performed 
properly, also assures better service to the public because its emphasis is on 
remedy and improvement and because it is in closer touch with practice, more 
aware o f changing needs, and more responsive to the wants of those who use 
the service than any other form of regulation can be.
SELF-REGULATION’S CHALLENGE
With this as background, let’s consider the problems faced in the establishment 
and maintenance o f any system of self-regulation. A major task of those involved 
in the process is one o f establishing mutual trust. Many members of the regulated 
group accept self-regulation with considerable reservation, and then they accept 
it only because they consider it less undesirable than the public alternatives. 
Few people seek regulation for its own sake. Professionals seem to find any 
regulation particularly irksome, a slight to their professionalism and a potential 
threat should it get out o f control.
Those who represent the public and have its best interests at heart are 
concerned that entrusting regulation to members of the profession is risky at 
best. They fear that self-interest and pressure from colleagues will discourage 
the establishment and maintenance of adequate standards. In addition, within 
the profession there will always be some who disagree with the self-regulatory 
process, no matter how it is conducted, and either refuse to cooperate or 
vigorously oppose what the majority o f the group has accepted. These disparate 
views must somehow be brought together sufficiently to permit the program to 
function.
Another difficulty is found in reforming the erroneous expectations enter­
tained by some who confuse self-regulation with public regulation. Those who 
have the point o f view of public regulation expect a visibly impressive level of 
activity. They want unequivocal evidence that the process is working effectively. 
Without that evidence, they contend the process lacks credibility. In their minds, 
public regulation is the model, and unless self-regulation emulates that model 
it isn’t as effective as they believe it should be. When their expectations aren’t 
met, they become critics o f the self-regulatory process.
At the other extreme are the expectations of the group subject to self­
regulation. Within that group will be some—often too many—who really expect 
no change from their previously unregulated condition. They deny any need 
for regulation and, at least in their own minds, contest the right of anyone, 
even their professional colleagues, to impose requirements on them. Others will 
accept regulation but only in those few cases in which there is great public 
interest that demands action if the profession is to avoid severe censure. To 
them, self-regulation means minimum interference with the status quo. Ob­
viously, the expectations o f all these interests cannot be met.
Finally, and because of these disparate views, there is the very real problem 
of maintaining satisfactory relationships between those engaged in self-regulation
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and those who have been entrusted with an oversight responsibility and would 
likely be charged with public regulation should the self-regulatory  process not 
succeed. If the latter do not perform their oversight responsibility, they fail 
their own assignments. If they perform that oversight with excessive zeal, self­
regulation is co-opted and becomes public regulation.
PROGRESS OF THE SECPS
Where is the profession now, insofar as the self-regulatory program for the 
SECPS is concerned? In a relatively short period of time, the section has made 
remarkable strides. It has adopted an impressive set of quality control standards 
and other requirements to be met by all members. A program of peer reviews 
has been established, reviewers have been trained, reporting mechanisms have 
been developed and a procedure by the peer review committee to evaluate the 
performance of completed peer reviews is in place and functioning. (This 
applies to the private companies practice section (PCPS) as well, although the 
PCPS is beyond the scope of this article.)
Recognizing that peer reviews, like audits, must be performed on a sampling 
basis, a special investigations committee (SIC) has been added to the SECPS to 
inquire into alleged audit failures charged by plaintiffs in litigation against any 
member firm. Such inquiries are designed to be no more burdensome on the 
member firm than necessary, but if circumstances suggest that there may be a 
need for important remedial measures, investigation of part or even all of the 
subject firm’s practice is likely to follow. In addition, at the completion of the 
investigation, a recommendation of sanctions, if considered necessary, will be 
made to the section’s executive committee.
The SEC, charged by Congress with an oversight responsibility, interacts with 
the section’s self-regulatory effort in a number of ways. It discharges its assigned 
responsibility in part by becoming familiar with and testing the work o f the 
peer review committee, which constitutes the cornerstone of the self-regulatory 
program. It also seeks assurance that the SIC is performing satisfactorily and 
that the POB’s oversight function is effective. To date, there has been no action 
on the part of the SEC that can be construed as a serious threat to the “se lf’’ 
designation of the section’s regulatory process. At the same time, I must report 
no lack of interest or failure of diligence in the performance of the SEC’s 
oversight function.
THE POB’S ROLE
The POB, four o f whose five members aren’t accountants, occupies an interesting 
position in the total scheme, a position with multiple responsibilities. It represents 
the public, meeting with various elements o f the self-regulatory program on a 
recurring basis to remind them of the public interest and the public viewpoint.
The POB has no line authority and desires none. From the beginning, it has 
taken the position that, if the process is to be one of self-regulation, all authority 
must be vested in members of the section. The POB can oversee, comment, 
suggest and point out; it cannot order or demand. The POB sees as its purpose 
the protection of the section’s right to self-regulation. It can achieve that purpose 
most effectively by reminding the SECPS executive committee o f how its decisions 
may be viewed by the public. Here’s an example.
There is an understandable tendency on the part o f member firms to object 
to any suggestion that technical membership rules be disregarded. They are
71
quite within their legal rights in doing so. Some rules were specifically intended 
to limit the scope o f members’ responsibility, for example, a cut-off date before 
which the SIC wouldn’t be concerned with cases in litigation. The POB recognizes 
this but on at least one occasion recommended a contrary point of view. Relying 
on technical rules, however legal, to avoid inquiries into alleged audit failures 
may be regarded by the public as contrary to the spirit of self-regulation. If 
there has been an audit failure, the section needs to know what it is, assess its 
implications for future service and assure that any necessary remedial action is 
taken.
Furthermore, the public is unlikely to favor technicalities that appear to 
protect substandard practice at the expense of investors. The public isn’t likely 
to be mollified with the statement, “Technically, the case can’t be inquired into.” 
It asks, “Do the facts in any way imply that current standards of audit performance 
are not being met?” and “Are the rules intended to protect the public or to aid 
firms in evading standards?” The POB serves the cause of self-regulation by 
pointing out the reasoning the public will apply.
The POB staff serves as a reviewer of peer review workpapers and the peer 
review process in general. The POB also serves as a buffer and provides liaison 
between the SEC and the section’s regulatory activities. In doing so, it must be 
able to understand and empathize with both but sympathize with neither. On 
some matters the views o f these two parties are remarkably similar; on other 
matters they differ widely. The POB strives to explain each to the other and to 
seek a working reconciliation wherever possible.
HOW GOOD IS PEER REVIEW?
Two questions have been asked often enough that they deserve comment:
1. Is peer review working?
2. As long as the profession has peer review, why does it need the SIC?
The two are closely linked. The first question is raised most frequently on 
the basis o f reports o f litigation in the financial press alleging accounting or 
audit failures. Why do these occur if peer review is effective?
There is no question in my mind that peer review is effective in improving 
the general quality o f audits performed by firms subject to it. The POB receives 
and reads copies o f all adverse and qualified opinions resulting from peer 
reviews; we sit in on some exit conferences; our staff reports to the board on 
letters o f comment to the managements of reviewed firms and on such 
managements’ responses to those comments. We observe in the peer review 
process an effectual and efficient combination of professional challenges and 
response, both in the performance of the review and in the reaction to it. Those 
cynics who see it as an exercise in mutual backscratching have no understanding 
of the effect o f peer criticism on proud and sensitive professionals in a highly 
competitive activity.
If peer review is working so well, why is there so much litigation? The peer 
review process is systems oriented. It is directed at the reviewed firm’s system 
of quality control. Litigation concerns specific cases. No system can assure that 
work performed by mortals will always be completely free of fault. Given the 
total number of audits required and the variety of conditions, distractions, 
pressures and personal problems faced by the auditors involved, some mistakes, 
lapses o f judgment, oversights and misunderstandings are as inevitable as death 
and taxes. Perfect audits in all circumstances and situations are as unlikely as 
sustained perfection in any other human activity.
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DOES THE PROFESSION NEED AN SIC?
Allegations of audit failure sufficient to initiate litigation against accountants 
may imply a weakness in a firm’s system of quality control. The fact that they 
may imply such a weakness requires attention. The SIC is charged with the 
responsibility o f ascertaining the probability of substance in such charges. A 
preliminary review is made of the allegations and the financial statements in 
question to discover whether the charges have any apparent foundation in fact. 
In some instances, this is enough to establish that they are groundless and the 
case can be closed. In other cases, the preliminary review finds enough in the 
allegations to warrant a discussion with the firm’s representatives and a review 
of recent peer review findings. In some instances, the circumstances are such 
that the SIC must conclude that there is a possibility that a failure in the firm’s 
system of quality control occurred and that it could happen again.
If so, an investigation is undertaken. The purpose of the investigation is to 
protect the public, not to try the case. The specific case is already in litigation; 
the court will determine the validity o f the plaintiff's allegations. But the court 
will go no further. It is incumbent on the self-regulatory process to protect the 
public against quality control breakdowns. If, and I emphasize the word if, the 
firm’s quality control process has failed in a specific case, the process may also 
have failed in other audits involving clients in the same industry or performed 
by the same personnel. A credible self-regulatory program must ascertain 
whether this is the fact and, if it is, take steps to see that the deficiency in the 
firm’s system is remedied.
When the implications of an alleged audit failure are deemed sufficient to 
threaten the public interest, the SIC investigates the firm’s system of quality 
control in terms much more specific than contemplated in recurring peer review. 
Peer review remains the cornerstone of the section’s self-regulatory process. 
Yet, no matter how effective peer review is, there will always be instances of 
alleged audit failure, and all of these raise questions about the firm’s quality 
controls. The SECPS needs the SIC to ascertain whether the potential for harm 
to the public exists and to demand remedial measures, if needed.
A LEARNING EXPERIENCE
For all concerned, this is a learning experience, an interesting, exciting and 
difficult experience. Many of the things are being done for the first time, not 
only by those doing them but for the first time by the profession. Unavoidably 
that means there will be some unhappy people. No one wants to be investigated 
or sanctioned. Neither does anyone in the process want to make the mistake of 
charging dereliction of duty without adequate support for the charge.
An interesting question has been raised about the type of people who should 
be appointed to the POB and to the SIC. Let me describe the current members 
of these units as I have come to know them through direct observation. All 
have carried important executive responsibilities; they are seasoned by long 
experience. They possess excellent personal reputations for integrity, depend­
ability and diligence, reputations that they are unwilling to see sullied in any 
way. They are prudent, courageous, understanding and intent on getting the 
facts. They have high standards of professional and public responsibility, are 
aware of the pressures and temptations that beset mortal man, and on occasion 
exhibit a strong sense of moral outrage. None of them is seeking to build a new 
reputation; their ambitions have been fulfilled. They can be trusted to take 
their public responsibilities seriously and to discharge them objectively.
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At the AICPA’s ninth national conference on current SEC developments in 
1982, members of the POB were criticized as not being “movers and shakers.” 
I expect that this is a fair description of their present activities, however vigorous 
their earlier careers may have been. I do not view such a description as pejorative 
in any sense, although it may have been so intended. My experience with movers 
and shakers is that they often leave a mess for someone else to clean up. Intent 
on fame and glory, they stride through life straightening out the affairs of lesser 
men whether or not such attention is needed. It is a good thing that some 
movers and shakers are part of the accounting profession. It is also a good 
thing that they aren’t members of the POB or the SIC. One quakes at the mere 
thought of what a first-class mover and shaker could do in such a position.
SOME FUTURE PROSPECTS
So I would offer some suggestions. To those who criticize an apparent lack of 
exciting actions, I note that they may continue to be disappointed. The self- 
regulatory process works most effectively when it is not in the public press. 
Don’t expect it to emulate public regulation; it should and does favor different 
methods and different goals. It will always favor investigations and sanctions 
directed at the improvement of audit service over those directed at mere 
punishment.
To those who object to the current self-regulatory process as too onerous, 
one can only assert that self-regulation is, in fact, regulation. Society expects 
more and more each year from those who have the good fortune to be regarded 
and rewarded as professionals. Those who are now engaged in any way within 
the accounting profession’s self-regulatory process are seriously endeavoring to 
improve the quality of professional practice without placing undue burdens on 
anyone. They appreciate, enjoy and take pride in the quality of their real world 
practice. Those who fail to meet satisfactory standards in their professional 
work will not be permitted to give the entire SECPS a bad reputation or to 
expose the self-regulatory process to undesirable risk.
I can also offer some assurances. Reconciliation of opposing influences within 
the section, and between the section and government, is no easy matter. Yet, it 
is progressing. Peer review and special investigations are proceeding. Liaison 
with the SEC is effective. The POB adds an essential public point of view, does 
not hesitate to make its views known and has been effective in causing 
reconsideration of decisions. Much has been done and there is much yet to do. 
All engaged in this effort are entitled to take some pride in current accomplish­
ments as long as they do not rest on that record. The real record of self­
regulation for accounting is yet to be made as the profession works its way 
through this period of economic stress and strain. The hard decisions are yet 
to come.
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appendix C
SECPS’S RESPONSE TO 
THE REPORT’S CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AlCPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 (212) 575-6200
September 27, 1984
Mr. B. Z. Lee, Chairman 
Board of Directors 
American Institute o f CPAs 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036
Dear Mr. Lee:
This letter is a progress report on the SEC Practice Section’s response to the 
conclusions and recommendations in the June 1984 Report of the Special Committee 
on the Review of the Structure and Operations of the SEC Practice Section (the “report”).
I am pleased to report that the SECPS Executive Committee has discussed 
the recommendations in the report at length and, at its meeting on September 
13, 1984, acted to implement measures that are responsive to a number o f those 
recommendations. In addition, as indicated below, the committee dealt with 
several recommendations by referring them to other groups within the division 
for study and suggestions on the most effective manner in which to implement 
them.
The following discussion is organized along the lines of the overview of the 
principal findings contained in Chapter 2 of the report.
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE SECTION
The SECPS agrees that there should be increased public awareness of the section 
and the beneficial effects of its efforts, and that the public’s understanding of 
the concept of self-regulation in the accounting profession should be enhanced. 
Accordingly, the SECPS and the Private Companies Practice Section, acting 
together, have engaged a well-known public relations firm to assist in a broad 
public information program which will be targeted at local, regional and national 
audiences. The initial program will stress the qualitative improvements in the 
practice of public accounting derived from the activities of the Division for CPA 
Firms. The program begins this fall and will extend over a twelve- to eighteen- 
month period. The results of the program will be monitored to determine its 
effectiveness in broadening the public’s understanding of the Division for CPA
75
Firms and its quest for professional excellence through peer review and 
continuing education.
The Executive Committee will ask public relations counsel to assist it in 
considering the various vehicles that could be used to provide information to 
the public on the scope and results of the peer review program and the special 
investigative process. In this connection, the Executive Committee must consider 
the role o f the Public Oversight Board in reporting to the public and whether 
and how this role would be affected by the issuance of periodic reports by the 
section itself. The Executive Committee believes that it is essential that the 
POB’s reports retain their unique importance to the public and will consult with 
the POB before implementing specific steps to deal with this recommendation. 
The section is continuing its consideration of various vehicles responsive to the 
recommendation.
INITIATIVES BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Representatives of SECPS member firms that have the privilege of serving on 
the section’s Executive Committee are aware of the associated responsibility. 
The Executive Committee is committed to providing the SECPS with the 
guidance and leadership necessary to achieve its objective of improving the 
quality of practice by member firms in a voluntary organization. The recom­
mendation in the report concerning Executive Committee representation is a 
helpful reminder in this regard.
The report suggests initiatives the Executive Committee might take to improve 
communications, develop new programs to enhance the benefits of membership, 
and clarify the conditions under which it would impose sanctions.
At the last three meetings of the Executive Committee, the chairman of the 
Peer Review Committee has presented expanded, detailed reports on peer 
review activity and special situations encountered in the process. The chairman 
or another representative of the Special Investigations Committee will attend 
Executive Committee meetings at least semiannually to report directly on SIC 
activities and developments.
To improve communications with members and nonmembers, the report 
suggests that the section hold annual meetings of member firms as technical 
and professional forums on SEC practice matters and that the section publish 
a quarterly newsletter for its members. The Private Companies Practice Section 
currently holds its own annual conference and publishes a quarterly newsletter. 
A Joint Coordinating Committee of the Division has been formed and will, 
among other things, consider how to implement this recommendation for 
improved communications and at the same time avoid unnecessary duplication 
and overlap that could be created if each section acts separately.
The Executive Committee has approved a Statement of Policy on the 
Imposition o f Sanctions, which is consistent with the views in the report; it will 
be published as an appendix to the SECPS Organizational Structure and 
Functions document in the SECPS Manual.
PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
The Executive Committee is pleased with the assessment in the report that the 
peer review program is an effective and beneficial mechanism for enhancing 
the quality of the accounting and audit practice of SECPS member firms. The 
Peer Review Committee continuously evaluates the program to ensure that it
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operates as efficiently as possible without reducing its effectiveness in achieving 
the section’s objectives. The Executive Committee is committed to the peer 
review process and agrees that the three-year interval for peer reviews remains 
appropriate at the present time.
The report suggests that the section adopt more specific requirements relating 
to the evaluation in peer review of the effectiveness of a firm’s second-partner 
review program. The Executive Committee has approved a revision of its 
existing guidance entitled Scope of Concurring Review so that both member firms 
and peer reviewers have a better understanding of what is expected from firms 
with respect to this membership requirement relating to SEC engagements. The 
Peer Review Committee will consider whether additional guidance is needed in 
the peer review compliance checklists.
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
As indicated in the report, the activities of the Special Investigations Committee 
complement the peer review process and function effectively to improve the 
quality o f member firms’ auditing practices. However, the report recommends 
steps be taken
•  Clarify the scope of the committee’s authority and its mode of operation.
•  Disseminate more information about its activities.
•  Expand the scope of the cases that member firms are required to report.
•  Achieve more equitable and consistent treatments o f the cost of special 
peer reviews.
The Executive Committee has approved a revised organizational document 
for the Special Investigations Committee. The revision more accurately describes 
the committee’s objectives, procedures and its authority; the revised document 
is consistent with the views expressed in the report. It will be published as an 
integral part of the SECPS Manual.
The Executive Committee recognizes that there has been little public infor­
mation about the activities of the Special Investigations Committee, because of 
the confidentiality surrounding the committee’s work, and that this circumstance 
increases the difficulty of obtaining full public acceptance. Confidentiality with 
respect to specific cases must be maintained, as noted in the report, in order 
for an investigative process to function effectively within a voluntary organization. 
However, the Executive Committee agrees that additional information about 
remedial and corrective measures resulting from the process could enhance the 
public’s confidence in the section’s self-regulatory programs.
Expanded disclosure of information relating to the investigative process is 
provided in the Public Oversight Board’s annual report for the year ended June 
30, 1984. How and when such information should be disclosed in the future is 
one of the matters that the Executive Committee will be working with public 
relations counsel to resolve, in consultation with the POB.
The report also recommends that the section make available in a manner 
appropriate for educational purposes information about unusual or recurring 
problems encountered in the investigative process. The Executive Committee 
has asked a task force to consider how to implement this recommendation in a 
manner that has truly educational benefit for the profession and the public 
while retaining the confidentiality necessary to insure the success of the 
investigative process.
The report recommends that the section’s membership requirement for
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reporting cases to the Special Investigations Committee be expanded to cover 
cases involving all entities in which there is a significant public interest. The 
Executive Committee has asked a task force to undertake an in-depth study of 
this recommendation.
The Executive Committee agrees with the recommendation that the cost of 
a special peer review of a firm conducted at the direction of the Special 
Investigations Committee should be borne by the firm involved without regard 
to the type of reviewing body. This recommendation is included in the revised 
organizational document for the Special Investigations Committee referred to 
earlier.
COORDINATION WITH THE PRIVATE COMPANIES 
PRACTICE SECTION
As recommended in the report, the Executive Committees of both the SECPS 
and the PCPS have appointed representatives to a Joint Coordinating Committee. 
That committee has already met three times. Its initial priority is implementation 
of the public information program referred to earlier.
The efforts of the Special Committees have resulted in many constructive and 
valuable recommendations. They should increase the effectiveness of the 
programs undertaken by the SEC Practice Section to improve the quality of 
practice by CPA firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
section remains committed to that objective.
Sincerely,
John W. Zick, Chairman 
SECPS Executive Committee
JWZ:cw
cc: SECPS Executive Committee
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